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ABSTRACT 
BETWEEN ORDER AND DISORDER: 
THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY AMONG OTTOMAN-IRANIAN TRIBES IN 
THE HAMIDIAN ERA 
Melahat Fındık 
M.A., History 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Selçuk Akşin Somel 
 
 
This study investigates how citizenship was perceived and implemented along the 
Iranian border during the Hamidian era. While explaining the process of transition from 
subjecthood to citizenship, my aim was to assert how the Ottoman Empire built 
citizenship approach throughout its people along the border. In this thesis I wanted to 
focus on which difficulties the Ottomans were confronted on creating citizens especially 
in the areas that remote from the center. One of these difficulties was the sectarian 
divergence between the Sunni and Shi’a sects, which derived from the formation of 
Shi’i Safavid state in the 16th century. This sectarian divergence affected the Ottomans’ 
nerves on creating loyal citizens in the Baghdad, Mosul and Basra provinces of the 
Empire. The second obstacle was the loose central control over these remote areas that 
produced local autonomous power holders. The last issue was the ambiguity of the 
borderline between the two states which made difficult determine the citizenship status 
of the nomadic tribes that wandering around the border.  
Keywords: Citizenship, the Ottoman Law of Nationality, Prohibition of Marriages 
between the Ottoman Women and Iranian Men, the Ottoman-Iranian Relations 
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ÖZET 
DÜZEN VE DÜZENSİZLİK ARASINDA: II. ABDULHAMİD DÖNEMİNDE 
OSMANLI-IRAN AŞİRETLERİ ARASINDA VATANDAŞLIK SORUNU 
Melahat Fındık 
Tarih Yüksek Lisans Programı 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Dr. Selçuk Akşin Somel 
 
Bu çalışma, II. Abdulhamid döneminde Osmanlı-İran sınırı boyunca vatandaşlık 
kavramının nasıl algılandığı ve uygulandığını araştırmaktadır. Tâbiiyetten vatandaşlığa 
geçiş sürecini açıklarken, amacım Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun sınırdaki insanlarına 
karşı nasıl bir vatandaşlık yaklaşımı geliştirdiğini ortaya koymaktır. Bu tezde, 
Osmanlıların merkezden uzak bölgelerinde vatandaşlar yaratmaya çalışırken karşılaştığı 
zorluklara odaklandım. Bu zorluklardan biri 16.yüzyılda Şii Safevi devletinin 
kurulmasıyla ortaya çıkan iki devlet arasındaki Şii-Sünni mezhep ayrılığıdır. Bu 
mezhepsel ayrılık Osmanlıların Bağdad, Musul ve Basra vilayetlerinde sadık 
vatandaşlar yaratma çabalarını etkilemiştir. Bu çabanın önündeki bir diğer engel de 
merkezi kontrolün zayıf olduğu bölgelerde yerel otonom güçlerin oluşmuş olmasıdır. 
Son olarak da iki devlet arasındaki sınırın kesin olarak belirlenmemiş olmasından dolayı 
sınır boyunca hareket halinde bulunan aşiretlerin vatandaşlıklarını  tespit edilmesi 
meselesidir.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Vatandaşlık, Osmanlı Vatandaşlık Kanunu, Osmanlı Kadınları ile 
İranlı Erkeklerin Evliliklerini Yasaklayan Kanun, Osmanlı-İran İlişkileri
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this thesis is to study a rather less researched aspect of late Ottoman 
history, namely the borderlands adjacent to Iran and the policies of the Sublime Porte to 
integrate its populations into the imperial administrative and political framework. These 
regions, stretching from Caucasus in the north down to the Persian Gulf,  included to an 
important extent tribal populations of various ethnic origins. Despite the fact that these 
areas were conquered by the Ottomans already in the early sixteenth century by Selim I 
(r. 1512-1520), continuous warfare with the Iranians throughout the sixteenth, 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries rendered these borderlands into an effective 
bufferzone between these two empires. The tribal and – partially – nomadic character of 
the local population constituted a major obstacle for the Sublime Porte to implement 
policies of centralization in the region. In addition, the geography of this border area, 
mountaneous as well as being located hundreds of kilometers away from Mediterranean 
or Black Sea ports, made it difficult for the Ottoman administration to reach the region. 
The lack of transportation means such as railroads or communication infrastructure like 
telegraph lines until the second half of the nineteenth-century rendered this locality a 
remote backyard of the Empire. 
The Tanzimat-era (1839-1876) signified the policy of administrative 
centralization as well as the foundation of the state of law, which entailed a uniform, 
rational and institutionalized administration throughout the imperial provinces. To 
achieve these goals, measures such as orderly conscription, population census, taxation, 
and the introduction of the notion of Ottoman citizenship were introduced. However, 
these measures could be implemented within the Ottoman lands only in an uneven way. 
The Capitulations imposed legal limitations which created an extraterritoriality for a 
significant part of Ottoman urban non-Muslim population, whereas interventions by 
foreign powers in favour of certain non-Muslim communities formed a sphere of 
immunity from government policies of citizenship. Another obstacle to the state policies 
of centralization and the development of the state of law concerned the Ottoman State 
itself. Since the Ottoman State defined its official religion as Sunni Islam, and the 
Ottoman sultan bore the Sunni Islamic title of Caliph, non-Sunni Muslim populations 
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such as the Bektashis, Qızılbashes, Zaydis and the Twelver Shiites, living in Anatolia, 
Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq, remained outside the legal reach of the state authority. 
The Sunni character of the Ottoman Empire on the one hand, and the Twelver 
Shiite character of Iran on the other, regularly created problems in terms of civil issues 
related to marriage, birth, conscription, death, and inheritance. Since the Sublime Porte 
did not acknowledge non-Sunni Islamic communities as religiously legitimate, any civil 
relationship between a Sunni Muslim Ottoman citizen and an Iranian citizen bore the 
potential of major legal problems.  
Examining the abovementioned issues in terms of borderland populations in the 
eastern parts of the Empire, the lack of a clearly settled borderline between the Ottoman 
Empire and Iran as well as its porosity created problems in defining the borderland 
tribes by means of their citizenship. Not only the transboundary migrations of regional 
tribes between the Ottoman lands and Iran, but also the possibility of marriages among 
the borderland populations of the Ottoman Empire and Iran were bound to produce legal 
issues of a considerable extent. These problems became exarcebated even more as a 
result of the reign of Abdülhamid II (r.1876-1909), who pursued the domestic policy of 
Islamism and was determined to extend administrative centralization to the borderlands.  
Until now the issue of Ottoman-Iranian relationship and the problem of 
borderland has been researched mainly in terms of political history. There has been 
some studies, notably of Nejat Göyünç and Cezmi Eraslan concerning Ottoman-Iranian 
diplomatic relationship during the Hamidian period. However, these studies provide us 
mainly a general view of this issue, without going deeper into the problems of the 
borderlands.1 J.C.  Edmonds has focused on the issue of the Ottoman-Iranian borderland 
                                                             
1 Cezmi Eraslan, “İslam Birliği Siyaseti Çerçevesinde II. Abdülhamid’in İlk Yıllarında 
Osmanlı-İran Münasebetleri”, in Prof.Dr. Bekir Kütükoğlu’na Armağan , (İstanbul: 
İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Araştırma Merkezi, 1991); Nejat Göyünç, 
“Muzafferiddin Şah ve II. Abdulhamid Devrinde Türk-İran Dostluk Tezahürleri”, in 
İran Şehinşahlığı’nın 2500. Kuruluş Yıldönümüne Armağan (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim 
Bakanlığı, 1971). 
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mainly in terms of political developments.2 The problems of inter-religious marriages 
between Sunnis and Twelver Shiites in Ottoman Iraq has been discussed by Karen M. 
Kern.3 However, the topic of Ottoman-Iranian borderline has been dealt more 
thoroughly by Sabri Ateş, in his unpublished PhD thesis titled “Empires at Margin: 
Towards a History of the Ottoman-Iranian Borderland and the Borderland Peoples 
1843-1881”.4 This thesis is crucial in terms of discussing this issue for the period of the 
Tanzimat, i.e. the period which precedes the reign of Abdülhamid II.   
This thesis has the object to demonstrate the political, social and legal 
difficulties borderland populations along the borderline of the Ottoman Empire and Iran 
had to face. Here the temporal concentration will be on the years between 1876 and 
1908, i.e. the reign of Abdülhamid II until the Young Turk Revolution. It also aims to 
bring into light the voices of some of the members of the borderland tribes which have 
been hitherto remained in silence. 
The study consists of four chapters. Chapter I, titled “The Issue of Citizenship in 
the Ottoman Empire,” discusses the development of the notion of citizenship as a part of 
the Tanzimat-reforms. After considering different European approaches towards 
citizenship, the policy of Ottomanism is taken into consideration as a binding element 
for Muslims and non-Muslims. In this context, the Reform Edict of 1856 and its effects 
are elaborated. Lastly, the Ottoman Law of Nationality of 1869 and its application are 
discussed. 
Chapter II (“Historical Background of Ottoman-Iranian Relations”) elaborates 
the complicated history of the Ottoman Empire and Iran, beginning from the Early 
                                                             
2 C. J. Edmonds, “The Iraqi-Persian Frontier 1639-1938”, Asian Affairs, Vol.6, Issue.2 
(June 1975). 
3 Karen M. Kern, Imperial citizen: marriage and citizenship in the Ottoman frontier 
provinces of Iraq, (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2011). 
4  Sabri Ateş: “Empires at Margin: Towards a History of the Ottoman-Iranian Borderland 
and the Borderland Peoples 1843-1881” (unpublished PhD Thesis, New York University, 
May 2006). 
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Modern Era until the Young Turk Revolution. Here the emergence of the Safavid state 
in 1501 and its specific characteristics as well as its struggle with the Ottoman power in 
the west until the early eighteenth century is related. Then the era of Nadir Shah and his 
campaigns in Iraq and eastern Anatolia are discussed. This is followed by the era of the 
Qajar dynasty, where the Ottomans and the Iranians, forced by the British and the 
Russians, had to setle their border issues through the two treaties of Erzurum (1823 and 
1847). Finally, the Hamidian period and its significance in Ottoman-Iranian relations 
are focused upon. 
These topics are followed by Chapter III, which discusses the issues of marriage 
and conscription. Firstly, the sectarian differences and their effects upon the inter-
religious marriages are scrutinized. This problem is treated within a historical 
perspective, which considers also the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth-century 
developments. Another issue which concerned the Ottomans was the expansion of 
Twelver-Shiism in Iraq and its political effects for the Ottoman rule in the region. It is 
shown that the Ottoman administration introduced the prohibition law of inter-religious 
marriages in 1874, and its actual lack of effictiveness both in the region as well as in the 
Ottoman capital. Another topic of this chapter focuses on the issue of conscription, 
which created major tensions between the Ottoman Empire and Iran. 
The final part of this thesis, Chapter IV (“Wandering Around the Border”), 
attempts to provide a more concrete picture of borderland populations which moved 
from the Ottoman to the Iranian side and vice versa. The chapter begins with the 
description of Ottoman government policies of sedentarization from the seventeenth to 
the nineteenth centuries. This is followed by the issue of rivalry of Ottoman and Iranian 
governments to gain the allegiance of the borderland tribes. At this point the concrete 
example of the Bilbas tribe is discussed in length. Finally the chapter comes to an end 
by focusing on the Beni Lam issue, where the Ottoman Empire and Iran tried to utilize 
the nomadic character of this tribe to expand their territories.       
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CHAPTER I 
 
THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
 
1.1. An Introduction to Citizenship 
Citizenship/nationality is the legal, political and social status of every person who 
belongs to a state, that is, is subject to its authority and may in return seek its protection. 
In describing legal character of citizenship there are two major aspects that must be 
taken into consideration. While one of them is the legal relations between the state and 
individuals, the other is individuals’ legally defined status. In this regard it will be 
possible to define citizenship through its formal and concrete meaning conjunctively5.  
Legal rules on citizenship constitute an integral unity and this unity includes rules 
about the acquisition, loss, naturalization and verification of citizenship. These rules 
differ from one state to another according to their legal, political and social 
considerations. Thus rules about citizenship are the subject of domestic law of each 
state. Although the relationship of individuals and state is same in principle, it can be 
perceived distinctively in different states.  
On the other hand, due to the relationship among states citizenship is also the 
subject of international law. Legal and political relations between individuals and state 
may concern other states or international communities. By the reason of the fact that 
states cannot act independently in the issues related to naturalization of individuals, they 
are bond to some international rules6.  
Acquiring citizenship is in principle inseparable from the time of birth. Time of 
birth is the most appropriate and the most exact time to confer the citizenship to an 
individual. To acquire citizenship by birth is called “natural/original citizenship”. There 
                                                             
5 Ergin Nomer, Vatandaşlık Hukuku, (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1989), p. 15.  
6 Rona Aybay, Yurttaşlık, Vatandaşlık Hukuku: Ders Kitabı ve Temel Yasa Metinleri, 
(Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi,1982), p.6. 
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are two systems to designate the citizenship that is acquired by birth. One of them is 
based on blood or descent jus sanguinis. The birthplace is not important and the child 
acquires both or any of he or she parents’ citizenship, and particularly of the father. In 
the other system the birthplace or soil jus soli is determinant to indicate the citizenship 
of an individual. In this system child acquires the citizenship of a state where he or she 
was born.  
Modern concept of citizenship takes its roots from the French Revolution. Hence 
the formation of modern concept of citizenship goes hand in hand with the historical 
process of state formation and nation building in the Western Europe. As from the midst 
of the 18th century states attempted to amass territories consisting ethnically and 
religiously heterogeneous populations under a centralized state. By doing this they 
followed two different methods: on the one hand they assimilated and integrated native 
ethnic and religious groups into equal citizens on the basis of jus soli principle, on the 
other hand they alleged as foreigner the individuals who did not have jus soli bond to 
the state according to jus sanguinis principle7.  
From the point of different understandings of nationhood, states made peculiar 
descriptions of their own citizenry. For instance while France’s state-centered and 
assimilationist policy affects the expansive and assimilationist citizenship law, 
Germany’s ethno-cultural emphasis on nationhood makes her to define the citizenry as a 
community of descent8. France is one of the states that its citizenship policy is based on 
jus soli principle and state-loyalty. France has had religiously and ethnically diverse 
populations and powerful enough elites who can avert the peripheral interests 
designated for unitary state. States like France aimed to reduce individuals’ loyalties to 
                                                             
7 Hakan G. Sıcakkan, “State Formation, Nation Building and Citizenship in Western 
Europe”, in Changing the Basis of Citizenship in the Modern State, Sıcakkan, Hakan G. 
and Yngve Lithman (eds.) (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2005), p. 40. 
8 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), p.14. 
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their own ethnic or religious communities and thus ensure amalgamation of individuals 
to the state9.   
However, Germany has a Volk-centered and differentialist way of understanding 
of nationhood that has an ethno-cultural basis. 19th century German intellectuals kept 
away themselves rational and cosmopolitan way of thinking of the Enlightenment and 
French Revolution and adopted cultural particularism10. Germans were advantageous 
having relative homogeneous territories and thus they were able to follow the jus 
sanguinis principle based on blood and descent. Their jus sanguinis identification was 
not restrained within boundaries, and so their policy was to include all the “blood 
brothers”11.  
There are also some differences in the practice of ascription between the two 
states that we have cited above. For instance while France citizenship is ascribed to 
most individuals born on French territory of foreign parents, German citizenship is 
ascribed only on the basis of descent. For Germany birth or prolonged residence have 
no influence on citizenship status. On the other hand, in both France and Germany, 
surely on Continental Europe, citizenship is ascribed to children of citizens, in 
accordance with the jus sanguinis principle. But however, in Britain and the Americas, 
citizenship is ascribed to all individuals born within the boundaries, due to the jus soli 
principle12. 
As the jus soli principle is regarded as an instrument to strengthen the state’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of religiously and ethnically heterogeneous societies, the 
principle of jus sanguinis is used as a tool of legitimizing ethnically homogeneous 
territories.  
 
                                                             
9 Hakan G. Sıcakkan, “State Formation, Nation Building and Citizenship in Western 
Europe”, p.40-41. 
10 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, p.1. 
11 Hakan G. Sıcakkan, Ibid, p. 42.  
12 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, p. 81.  
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1.2. Ottomanism as a Binding Element 
Ottoman Empire was composed of various religious and ethnic groups and these 
groups were made to live in equilibrium with parameters designated by Ottoman 
political system.  Within this political system, these groups were classified into 
religious-based communities known as “millets”. This term of “millet” did not have an 
ethnic meaning that we understand today; it was used to describe “religious 
community”, such as Muslim millet or Orthodox millet 13.  
The meaning of the term of millet changed in time. Before the Tanzimat reforms 
the term millet was used for community of Muslims in contrast to dhimmis, autonomous 
protected community of non-Muslim subjects of the Empire. Until the 19th century the 
Ottomans preferred to use the term ahl al-dimma for its non-Muslim subjects in its 
internal affairs, since they used the term millet for Christians in its external affairs. 
According to Benjamin Braude the main reason of this choice was sovereignty: there 
were two religious authorities who possessed sovereignty that the Islamic Ottoman 
sultans and powerful Christian rulers. Again for Braude, prior to the 19th century the 
Empire did not have an institutionalized policy toward its non-Muslim subjects. From 
this century onwards the European understanding of millet started to be used in the 
Ottoman institutional vocabulary.14  
From the midst of the18th century the parameters of the equilibrium started to 
change. From this time forth, a shift was observed within the Greek and Armenian 
communities. Rum and Armenian merchants, who had economic relations with 
European countries, while becoming acquainted with Western Enlightenment ideas, 
they also became dissociated from the traditional ties of their communities which made 
them bound to the Ottoman state.  As a consequence, the emergent middle class eroded 
the traditional religion-based structure of the Ottoman society. Enlightenment ideas 
made the youth of emergent middle class to adopt a secular world view and to search 
for their ethnic identities in their national origins rather than in their religious 
                                                             
13 Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Osmanlıcılık”, Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi 
Cilt V (İstanbul: İletişim, 1985), p. 1389. 
14 Benjamin Braude, “Foundation Myths of the Millet System”, in Christians and Jews 
in the Ottoman Empire, Vol.1.(New York:Holmes &Meier, 1982), p. 69-73. 
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communities15. This propensity eventually caused the separation of the non-Muslim 
millets as independent nations.  
From the 19th century onwards the Ottomans sought to take remedial measures to 
prevent possible disintegration of its non-Muslim subjects. By the Tanzimat reforms in 
1839, all individuals, who lived in Ottoman lands, would be regarded as Ottoman 
subjects regardless of their faith and language. As for the Reform Edict of 1856 each 
millets were allowed to reform themselves. From this point of view the Armenian, the 
Greek and the Jewish millets made several reforms within their communities. These 
reforms had paved the way for strengthening their national consciousness. According to 
Kemal H. Karpat, the reforms were, in fact, the last phase in the dissolution of the 
traditional millet system. By this reform, millets became subjected to the state’s control 
and surveillance. By this means the state was quite easily expand its authority over 
secular activities of these communities. By the virtue of this intervention the millet had 
changed to “confessional groupings dealing strictly with religious matters”.16 
By being regarded as Ottoman citizens, non-Muslims wanted to benefit from the 
Ottoman law, but on the other hand they did not want to lose the privileges that were 
granted for them under the traditional millet system. Thus, at the same time, they 
became constantly complaining about the obligations violated by the Ottoman state as 
citizens and demanding their old privileges. Additionally, they were generally supported 
by European powers in their activities against the policies of the Ottoman state which 
made the Ottoman Empire vulnerable to foreign intervention.17 It was in this 
environment the Ottomans sought for new measures to provide its unity. 
Nineteenth century reforms opened a new era of extensive socio-economic and 
ideological transformation in the Ottoman Empire. During this transformation while 
                                                             
15 S.Akşin Somel, “Osmanlı Refom Çağında Osmanlıcılık Düşüncesi (1839-1913)”, 
Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce. Cilt 1. Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi 
(İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), p.90. 
16 Kemal H. Karpat, “ Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation 
and State in the Post-Ottoman Era”, in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, 
Vol.1., in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, Vol.1.(New York:Holmes 
&Meier, 1982), p. 162-165. 
17 Ibid., p.165. 
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traditional order was disintegrating, there occurred a need for “fundamental recasting of 
Ottoman society” that would help to cement the new order. In order to accomplish this 
strengthening project, Ottomanism was seen as the most influential tool whereby it 
would be possible to maintain loyalties of disparate populations of the empire to the 
state and the Sultan18.  
Ottomanism regards all different religious and ethnic groups within the Empire as 
members of a single “Ottoman millet” and aims to integrate them into a common 
empire ideal. S. Akşin Somel indicates that between the 1839 and 1913 this idea of 
Ottomanism evolved into four different phases.  In the first phase, from 1830s to 1875, 
we mainly observed the authoritarian centralist policies of the Sublime Porte (Bâb-ı 
Âli); the significant characteristics of the second phase were opposition of the Young 
Ottomans and constitutionalist pragmatism in between 1868 and 1878; in the Hamidian 
Era, as the third phase, Ottomanism was used as a tool of Young Turks opposition 
against Hamidian absolutism; and finally the fourth phase, Ottomanism during the 
Second Constitutional Period, until the Balkan Wars (1912-1913).19 
Ottomanism also implies a radical disengagement from the traditional Ottoman 
state ideology. Ottomanism, in a sense, means the gradual appearance of modern 
political ideas, which are based on the principles of citizenship and equality before the 
law, instead of pre-modern political ideas which divided the people into compartments 
according to their status20.  
The distinctive characteristic of Tanzimat discourse underlined the equality of all 
subjects before the law irrespective of religious affiliation. Sultan, as having 
indisputable power, was depicted as father figure that all the subjects- citizens had to 
                                                             
18 Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and 
Change, (New York: Routledge, 2005), p.9. 
19 Selçuk Akşin Somel, “Osmanlı Refom Çağında Osmanlıcılık Düşüncesi (1839-
1913)”, p. 88. 
20 Ibid, p.89. 
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obey him without any objection. However not all the subjects were only equal in the 
eyes of the Sultan, they were also equal to submit him21.  
The Tanzimat-statesmen of the 19th century endeavored to establish a new, 
egalitarian definition of Ottomanism, a sort of “imperial supra-nationalism” as a sign of 
conceptualization of patriotism22. For Selim Deringil, Ottomanism presented much 
more supra-religious character during the heyday of Tanzimat era23.  
In addition to Ottomanism, “Ottoman patriotism” was another approach, 
articulated in the ideas of vatan (fatherland), that stressed the adherence of all subjects 
of the Sultan to a territorially defined fatherland and it ruling dynasty. As the two 
prominent statesmen of the Tanzimat era, Âli and Fuad Pashas aimed to formulate a 
new political community that could include the whole population of the Empire, and to 
create a new nationality grounded on equal Ottoman citizens who reckoned the Ottoman 
Empire as their fatherland. For this purpose they anticipated to change the direction of 
the loyalty of the non-Muslims from the local religious community and Ottoman 
dynasty to the fatherland and state24.  
 
1.3. The Reform Edict of 1856  
Orthodox Greeks won independence in the Peloponnese, a menacing example to 
the Empire’s other non-Muslim populations, encouraging Russia to look to the Ottoman 
Orthodox as a convenient fifth column.  
                                                             
21 Usama Makdisi, “After 1860: Debating Religion, Reform and Nationalism in the 
Ottoman Empire”, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol 34, No.4, 2002, 
p.606. 
22 Carter Findley, “ The Advent of Ideology in the Middle East, I”, Studia Islamica 55 
(1982), p. 165.  
23 Selim Deringil, The well-protected domains: ideology and the legitimation of power 
in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909 (London; New York: I. B. Tauris, 1998), p. 45. 
24 Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Christians between Ottomanism and Syrian Nationalism: 
The Ideas of Butrus Al-Bustani”, International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol. 11 
No.3 (1980), p. 287.  
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At the beginning of 1850s there was a contention among the Great Powers and 
Russia to strengthen their influence over the Empire’s non-Muslim subjects. They were 
trying to accommodate particular protection for the priests of their protégés in the Holy 
Land. In 1853 Russia embarked on a religious dispute in Palestine as a plea to claim that 
Sultan recognized her right to protect all the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman 
Empire; claiming that the Orthodox formed the 25% of the Empire’s total population, 
and this was enough to demand political patronage over the Ottoman Empire as a 
whole. After the refusal of her demand by the Empire, Russia seized Moldavia and 
Wallachia, and in July 1853 the Ottoman government declared war.25Since a possible 
Russian invasion of Ottoman lands would constitute a threat to the vital strategic 
interests of Britain, France and Austria, these powers took the side of the Sublime Porte 
By the end of the Crimean War the Ottoman Empire and its Western allies 
Britain, France, Austria and Sardinia gained a clear victory, and with signing of 1856 
Treaty of Paris the war was officially ended. In accordance with the articles of this 
treaty Russia was compelled to return occupied European and Asiatic territories to the 
Ottoman Empire, and was interdicted to maintain a fleet or fortifications on the Black 
Sea. Besides all these, with the treaty Ottoman Empire was admitted to the Concert of 
Europe, its independence and territorial integrity were guaranteed by the Great Powers. 
On the other hand, the Empire was made to guarantee the rights of its non-Muslim 
subjects and to maintain reforms which were pledged before and a Reform Decree was 
issued on February 4, 1856, guaranteeing equality and reforms for all subjects.26 
With the Reform Edict of 1856 the legal equality of all Ottoman subjects was 
formally recognized and this was an attempt of an ascription of common citizenship to 
all subjects regardless of their religious belonging. By this means non-Muslims were 
granted access to careers in government service, and reforms imbedded the millet 
communities via which they had frequently benefited from a rule of self-government.27 
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 Formal granting of equal rights guarantee would not be able to solve the problem 
brought by the political aspirations of the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire. The 
problem was two-fold; it had economic as well as social aspects. Non-Muslim 
communities, especially in the Balkan Peninsula, became wealthy and powerful through 
their cultural and economic contact with Europe. As a result of increasing foreign and 
domestic trade a new non-Muslim middle class emerged, including urban merchants 
and artisans. While these merchants and artisans were accorded with the new-
established system, schoolmaster, priests and clerks were not. Because they were more 
open to revolutionary ideas, and especially to the new-imported ethnic nationalistic 
ideas. 
The Reform Edict had opened a window of opportunity to the Ottoman 
government to integrate non-Muslim subjects into political and social structure of the 
Empire. Âli and Fuad Pashas’, two of the most important Tanzimat reformers, aim was 
to establish a new political community which would circumscribe the whole population 
of the Empire and create a new nationalistic frame which consisted on equal Ottoman 
citizens28.  
The modernization of devices of government were extended, with new ministries, 
legal reforms, Vilayet Law of 1867 to regulate provincial government, and with the 
object of centralization telegraph network was also expanded. In addition, in 1858 new 
Penal Code was issued and in 1860 commercial courts that had been combined with 
mixed courts was reorganized. All of these regulations were indigenous in character but 
1861Commercial Law and 1863 Maritime Commercial Law both were the product of a 
process of reception of French laws29.  
Within the context of regulations on jurisprudence, one of the most important 
developments was the compilation of Mecelle-i Ahkam-ı Adliye, the master and civil 
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code which would be executed in both mixed commercial courts and statutory courts 
(nizamiye mahkemeleri). Subjects of personal status such as marriage, divorce and 
inheritance were left out of this code and remained under the control of religious courts. 
The main reason behind this was the following necessity: Mecelle was written in a 
period where both mixed commercial courts and civil courts were lacking able jurists 
and so by compilation of it, it was aimed to instruct and teach these kinds of jurists. 
Besides this main object, there were additional reasons which why the subjects of 
personal status did not included in Mecelle. Firstly, the Ottoman Empire was consisted 
of peoples of various religions and sects and all of these had their own family law. So it 
made difficult to make a code including all details for each religion or sect and 
eliminate divergence among them. The second reason behind that is more or less related 
to the first one: during the compilation of family law there would be possible objections 
from the authorities of religious communities. So, within the context of all these 
reasons, like in other legislating examples, regulations were first done on less debated 
issues like law of obligations and commercial law, while regulations on family law, 
which would cause many debates and objections, was postponed.30 
In the Hamidian Era, the meaning of citizenship was reinterpreted to adopt the 
Empire’s Turkish-, Arabic- and Kurdish-speaking Muslims, who embodied nearly 
seventy five percent of the Empire’s population. Within the context of Pan-Islamism 
Abdulhamid II’s aim was to create a kind of spiritual citizenship compromising an 
imagined Muslim umma overlapped with modern political map.31 
 
1.4. Ottoman Law of Nationality 
During the first three quarters of the 19th century, the Ottoman state concentrated 
on individuation, enumeration and categorization of subjects in addition to mobilization 
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of their resources and bodies associated with fiscal and military necessities. With 
censuses, by determining taxable rural populations and potential male conscripts, the 
state obtained new instruments to monitor its populations. By this means Ottoman 
statesmen aimed to reaffirm supreme claims over land, peoples and resources on the one 
hand and by giving basic rights and universal political identity to reinforce its subjects 
on the other.32 
In 1869, the Ottoman Law of Nationality was promulgated in consideration of 
averting Empire’s subjects to seek citizenship or protection of another state. The 
promulgation of the Law was a precaution and a reaction to non-Muslim subjects who 
acquired citizenship of other states by using the legal opportunities of Capitulations.  
The capitulary privileges enabled the Great Powers to confer their own citizenship 
upon Ottoman subjects. By means of these capitulations foreigners gained individual, 
legal and administrative privileges and also were entitled to have protégés.   
By the Law, it was aimed to circumscribe legal Ottoman population and 
circumvent the increase of foreign residents and their protégés who did not hesitate to 
appeal international treaties for fiscal and legal privileges33.  
The Law was based on jus sanguinis (blood) principle, i.e. only those born to 
Ottoman parents were regarded as Ottoman citizens and with a particular emphasis on 
the father. According to the Law, having a foreign father was out of concern. This is 
because an Ottoman woman who is married with a foreign man would acquire her 
husband’s citizenship and their child would become foreigner. On the other hand, the 
child’s situation was determined on the basis of her or his moment of birth; the changes 
of her or his father’s citizenship after the birth would not affect her or his citizenship 
status.  
The Law, which consisted of nine articles, regulated the terms of acquisition, loss 
and expatriation of citizenship.  This Law was an adaptation of a French law of 1851 
which itself took its roots from the 1804 French Civil Code. According to 12th and 19th 
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articles of this Civil Code “the foreigner who shall marry a Frenchman shall follow the 
condition of her husband” and “a Frenchwoman who shall marry a foreigner shall 
follow the condition of her husband”. As understood from these articles the French law 
put women to a passive position and regarded them as beings who needed the protection 
and support of husbands. From this point of patriarchal authority, it is possible to say 
that French Civil Code is based on ancient Roman tradition, thus the father as the head 
of family had all rights over women. By the reception of French Law, the Ottoman Law 
of Nationality, while sharing the idea of patriarchal authority, the already existing 
patriarchal structure of Ottoman family was reinforced34.  
In the Law, beside the jus sanguinis principle, the jus soli principle also used to 
determine citizenship. According to the second article of the Law, a person who was 
born in the domains of the Empire, in spite of her or his parents being foreigner, could 
apply for Ottoman citizenship within three years after he or she reaches maturity. 
Moreover, as for article nine, people who live continuously within the domains of the 
Empire, would be regarded as Ottomans and if there would be anyone who strove to 
disaffirm this, he or she had to prove his or her claim.  
The status of married Ottoman women was also designated in the Law. As per 
article seven, if an Ottoman woman marries a foreign man, she would then be required 
to acquire her husband’s citizenship, and if her husband dies she could return to 
Ottoman citizenship within three years after her husband’s death.  
The fifth article of the Law was a concrete step to obviate renouncement of 
Ottoman citizenship which stemmed from the Capitulations.  This is because, as per this 
article, renouncement of Ottoman citizenship was attributed to the behest of the Sultan.  
With regard to naturalization; a person who lived regularly in the Ottoman Empire 
for five years, could acquire Ottoman citizenship by applying to the Foreign Office 
(Hariciye Nezareti). In some instances this criteria could be ignored and Ottoman 
citizenship could be ascribed as long as they serve for the state and are Muslims. 
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When we consider both the Law of Prohibition of Marriages between Ottoman 
women and Iranian Men of 1874 within the context of the Ottoman Law of Nationality, 
we come across some legal gaps between them. Thus, according to seventh article of the 
Ottoman Law of Nationality “if an Ottoman woman marries a foreign man, she would 
then be required to acquire her husband’s citizenship”, but on the contrary in the third 
article of Prohibition Law of 1874 “if an Ottoman woman marries an Iranian man 
against the prohibition, both the woman and her children will be considered Ottoman 
citizens and obliged to conscription, military tax, and other financial obligations”. So, 
this legal gap would always cause trouble to the Ottomans in her relations with Iran and 
Iran would never hesitate to use this gap in order to claim suzerainty over her Iranian 
subjects who lived within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF OTTOMAN- IRANIAN RELATIONS 
 
From the midst of the fourteenth century onwards there emerged a new state and 
religious sect in the east, while the Ottomans, especially Murad II and Mehmed II, were 
trying to establish centralized Ottoman control over eastern parts of Anatolia. At that 
time, under the leadership of Shaikh Safiuddin, the Safavid movement was found and 
took its shape by being transformed from Sufism to Shi’ism.35 
The formation of the Safavid state in 1501 under the leadership of Shah Ismail 
was a defining moment in Persian history. First of all, they revived Persian suzerainty 
all over the area that was regarded as the heartlands of Persia for the first time since the 
Arab conquest of Persia eight and half centuries before. 36 
Shah Ismail declared Twelver Shi’ism form of Shi’i Islam as the official religion 
of the newly established state with the exception of the Fatimid Caliphat: this kind of 
step had never been taken by a major Islamic state throughout the history of Islam. 
Naturally, his advisors warned him because of this initiation, considering that Tabriz 
was composed entirely of Sunnis and they could violently resist to the Shi’i Muslims. 
So what made Shah Ismail take this initiation? 37 
This binary composition of Sunni-Shi’i sects emerged in Iran from the time of 
Mongol invasion, onwards and also in the 14th and 15th centuries, after the collapse of 
Il-Khans, it continued to give shape the religious stance of the people. At this point 
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there occurs another question: what did the people of 15th century understand from the 
terms of “Shi’a” and “Sunni”? 38  
Sheikh Safi, the founding father of Safaviyya, was in fact a Sunni and belonged to 
the Sha’fi sect, which is the closest to Shi’a among other sects of Islam. Therefore, it 
was easy to be adopted by Shi’is who felt uncomfortable themselves while disguising as 
Sunni. After Sheikh Safi we see Junaid, the grandfather of Shah Ismail, who lived in 
Konya at the same time when a famous theologian, Sheikh Abd al-Latif was there and 
acquired a pro-Shi cognizance from him. Additionally, Shah Ismail’s father Haidar had 
been brought up at the court of his uncle Uzun Hasan in Diyarbakır where it was 
impossible for him not to feel sympathy towards the Shi’ism. It is understood to this 
point that the worship of Ali was very common in Shah Ismail’s environment and in 
time it rooted strongly in him and an inclination towards Shi’a became prevalent.39 
Shah Ismail’s religious beliefs took its shape in Lahican which followed his flee 
from the soldiers of Sultan Rustan Aq Quyunlu. From 1494 onwards he spent five years 
under the protection of Karkiya Mirza Ali, who declared to be a descendant of the 
Caliph Ali and was a Shi’i. During his life in Lahican, Shah Ismail became a student of 
Shams al-Din Lahiji who was a pupil of Ibn Fahd al-Hilli, a famous Shi’a jurist, who 
came from a tradition that believes the idea of  the “necessity of imamate” – “a mode of 
justification of political authority in terms of the maintenance of public order through 
the enforcement of the shari’a” -.40  
From this point of view it is plausible to consider the effect of religious beliefs 
upon Shah Ismail’s political intentions that he was affirming a Shi’i theocracy and 
claiming himself at its head. When he left Lahican in 1499 he was twelve years old. At 
that time political circumstances were convenient for his religious and political claims. 
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The power of the Aq Quyunlus was more or less in decline because of the quarrel over 
the succession that derived from the death of Sultan Yaqub in 1490. The effect of the 
Timurids in Persia had decreased after the fall of Abu Said. Both the Ottomans in the 
west and the Uzbeks in the east were incapable of interfering in the affairs of Iran in 
view of their domestic affairs41. Taking all of these into account, this political vacuum 
in Iran opened up a window of opportunity to Shah Ismail for establishing Safavid 
control over Iran.  
Shah Ismail’s army was mostly composed of Turkmen tribes which he had 
brought from Lahican and which joined him during his winter camp on Caspian Sea. 
Shah Ismail had affected these oppressed people with his personal appearance and 
religious ideas. Shah Ismail was commonly adored and idolized amongst many 
Turcoman tribesmen who united in their thousands under his standard. His pretention to 
semi-divinity was accepted by huge amounts of Turcoman tribesmen in Anatolia and he 
was supported in his claim to the throne of Persia42. On this basis, to look for further 
enhancement he launched a campaign towards Erzincan in eastern Anatolia, in the 
middle of March 1500 and consequently his army reached at 7.000 men.  After this 
campaign, he made his way to Shirvan and at the village of Jabani he defeated Shirvan 
Shah on December 1500. His victory over Shirvan Shah had disquieted Alvand, the 
Sultan of Aq Quyunlu and a grandson of Uzun Hasan like himself; their clash resulted 
with the decisive victory of Shah Ismail, such that the way to Tabriz, the Türkmen 
capital, was opened up to him, in August 1501.  
Soon after his arrival at Tabriz, Shah Ismail embarked upon to institute the Shi’i 
sect as the state religion. It is generally assumed that he made this decision because of 
his religious conviction, not because of political interests. Taking this decision, he 
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planned to annihilate the Sunnis with their respect towards the first three Caliphs and to 
provide the hegemony of the belief in Ali and the Twelve Imams.43 
 The triggering factors underlying Shah’s decisions were the religious beliefs and 
the idea of reinforcing his incipient state with an ideology that would make it different it 
from its powerful Sunni neighbor, the Ottoman Empire.44 
The roots of the conflict between the Ottomans and the Safavids were based on 
something more than territorial. The Safavids were manipulating their large Kızılbaş 
followers which extended beyond the Ottomans’ borders and throughout Anatolia. 
These circumstances comprised a crucial threat to Ottoman suzerainty.45 
Before Shi’ism was declared as the state religion by Shah Ismail, Shi’ism was not 
regarded as a threat by the Ottomans. But when the Shah defeated the already collapsing 
Aq Qouyunlu state in Azerbaijan and took Tabriz in 1501, the direction and character of 
the Ottoman – Iranian relations changed considerably. There were two main reasons 
that led to this alteration. One of them was the unorthodox and heretic character of Shah 
Ismail’s Shi’a that contained pre-Islamic Turkic beliefs. The second one was that Shah’s 
power was mainly built upon the Turcomans of Anatolia and Azerbaijan who were 
nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes that were standing out against the settled Sunni 
governments since the Seljukid period. However, from the beginning of reign of 
Bayezid II, discontent among these groups reoccurred. The Shah did not miss this 
opportunity and succeeded to gather these disaffected groups around him.46 
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 Although Sultah Bayezid II was aware of the expansionist policy of Shah, he did 
not take effective measures against this ever-growing trouble. According to Allouche 
the Ottomans’ reaction under the Bayezid II was flexible since he was aware of the 
support which Shah Ismail enjoyed among the numerous Kızılbaş in Anatolia47. He only 
prohibited the migration of Turcoman populations to Azerbaijan, and instead relocated 
them to Morea. At the same time, he prohibited circulation of Safawid coins, that he 
regarded its circulation as a tool of propaganda, within the Empire48.  The appeasement 
policy of Bayezid II, gave the Safavids free hand, thus they did not only spread Shi’ism 
within Iran, but at the same time took the initiative within the Ottoman Empire by 
fomenting rebellions and stirring trouble later on49. For example the rebellion of 
Şahkulu Baba Tekelü , supported by the Safavids, broke out in southern Anatolia in 
1511 was suppressed by the Ottomans only with great difficulty. All these 
developments were not welcomed by Istanbul’s military circles and they believed that 
only Prince Selim, the youngest son of Bayezid II, could avert this crisis and save the 
State. On the other hand, Bayezid II intended to leave the throne to his eldest son 
Ahmad. After brutal struggles, Selim I killed his brothers and nephews, who could turn 
into possible threats to his rule, and captured the throne in 1512.50 
On 20 April 1514, Sultan Selim I left Istanbul at the head of a large army after 
having obtained a fatwa from Sunnite clerics of that time, supporting the legitimacy of 
the military campaign against Shah Ismail. Eventually, the Ottoman and Safavid armies 
encountered at the field of Çaldıran on 23 August 1514. The battle ended with the 
absolute victory of the Ottoman army, by virtue of its superiority in number, its 
innovative military tactics, and especially the extensive use of firearms. Shah Ismail, 
lost many of his followers and commanders, though he managed to escape wounded 
from the battlefield.  
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As a result of the battle of Çaldıran by occupying Diyarbakır and capturing 
Erzincan the Ottomans got the opportunity to create an Ottoman zone in the Upper 
Euphrates which was standing at the middle of the major routes linking Iran to Anatolia 
and northern Syria, especially Aleppo. By having this area under control the Ottomans 
would be able to launch future expeditions into both Iran and Syria with relative ease.51 
The Ottomans’ exact victory over Iran and their possession of Upper Euphrates 
alarmed the Mamluks, who wanted to build a control over the Taurus. In 1515 Ala ud-
Dawla Dulqadir, the vassal of Mamluks in southern Anatolia was defeated by Selim I’s 
armies and Dulqadir province was annexated. This was an event that triggering the 
conflict and wars between the Mamluks and the Ottomans.  With the campaigns of Marj 
Dabiq (1516) and Raydaniyah (1517) Syria and Egypt were conquered and Ottoman 
sovereignty extended to the Hijaz. By this way, Ottoman authority was stretched from 
the plains of Central Europe to the shores of the Red Sea.  
This newly-pictured suzerainty map changed the character of the relations 
between the Ottomans and the Iranians. From this time onwards, both sides were on the 
lookout for a suitable opportunity to defeat each other.  
After the death of Selim I, his son Süleyman ascended the throne in 1520 and 
inherited a powerful and stabilized state from his father. On the other hand, when Shah 
Tahmasp I had ascended the Iranian throne in 1524, he had inherited a state that was 
almost ruined because of intrigues and disputes among Türkmen tribes on the one hand, 
possible threats of the Ottomans in the west and the Uzbeks in the east, on the other. 
The Iranian-Uzbek conflicts for Khurasan had lasted about twenty six years, from the 
very beginning of Tahmasp’s reign to 1540.52  
The Ottomans, surely, would not miss this opportunity to attack the Iranians. 
Süleyyman I, firstly, sent the Ulama Hüseyin to Hasankeyf, as a governor with the 
charge of conquering Bitlis and providing support to Ottoman campaign against Iran. 
Thereafter, in July 1534, the Ottoman Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha occupied Tabriz and 
two months later the Sultan himself entered the city. Then he advanced via Hamadan on 
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Baghdad and at the end of the November the city was surrendered without any struggle. 
This inclined the Sultan to launch a new campaign against Iran in the following Spring. 
The Shah was reluctant to fight a pitched battle, instead he preferred to attack the 
Ottoman guards and pull them in skirmishes. At the end of 1535, the Sultan started to 
return to Istanbul without gaining any benefits, except the conquest Baghdad. Suleyman 
I, was unable to reach his main goal that of freeing himself from the Iranian threat in his 
rear, while he was dealing with the western front.53 
In the Spring of 1548 the Ottomans again attacked Iran. This campaign again 
lasted two years and again the Ottomans could not gain a decisive victory. While the 
Sultan retreated to winter camp at Aleppo, Tahmasp had been expanded on large 
territories of eastern Anatolia. When the Ottomans retreated in the late Autumn of 1549, 
shortly afterwards Tahmasp’s son Ismail Mirza invaded eastern Anatolia, occupied 
various towns in the neighborhood of Van, captured Ahlat and then Erciş, and defeated 
the governor of Erzurum, İskender Pasha. Thereupon, in May 1554, Sulayman I left his 
Winter camp in Aleppo for Diyarbakır and marched as far as Qarabagh. When he came 
back to Erzurum in August all that had been gained was abundant pillage and 
considerably insignificant skirmishes. There was nothing to do except accepting the 
armistice proposal that was offered by the Iranian envoy. Thus, in the following spring, 
a peace treaty was signed in the Sultan’s camp at Amasya on 29 May 1555, the first 
official peace between the Ottomans and the Safavids.54  
 After the death of Shah Tahmasb in 1576, his son Ismail II ascended the throne. 
Although his relatively short reign, only eighteen months, one of the most exceptional 
measures that he intended to achieve shortly after assuming power, was the 
implementation of the Sunni faith. There were several reasons which lie behind this 
initiation: Ismail had spent twenty years in prison because he was accused of attempting 
to overthrow his father. His years in prison might have affected his mind. As soon as he 
came to throne he executed both his opponents and some of his supporters. On the other 
hand he was certainly aware of the influence of Shi’i dignitaries upon the domestic 
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affairs of the state. For him, the extremely powerful position of them which have been 
only thwarted by a re-introduction of the Sunna.55 
  His death was followed by an area of discord in Iran and the Ottomans did not 
lose this chance: Although Grand Vizier Mehmed Sokullu Pasha was willing to abide 
by the Peace of Amasya, Sultan Murad III was determined to war and sent his army to 
invade Azerbaijan in 1578.  A series of upheavals in the Iranian frontier areas among 
the Kurds and in Shirvan paved the way for the Ottoman plans. The defeat of the 
Safavids opened the doors of Georgia to the Ottomans. In 1585 they captured Tabriz, 
where was the capital of the Safavids for twenty years56.  
The direction of the situation was changed for the favor of the Safavids in 1588 
with the succession of Abbas I to the throne. When he came to throne Iran was 
struggling with both internal and external threats. Within the state, prolonged conflicts 
among the Turkmen tribes had caused the weakness of central government. On the other 
hand, the Ottoman and Uzbek threats were hanging over Iran like the sword of 
Democles. He, at first, embarked to defuse the internal pressure by breaking the 
monopoly of the Turkmen leaders and suppressing the constant quarrels among the 
tribes. During his reign, most of the Turkmens had lost their social status.57 
By providing domestic stability Abbas I, at this time, had to take some initiatives 
to remedy his foreign affairs. He was rather reluctant to accept a peace with the 
Ottomans. But since it was impossible to defeat them as long as there were revolts in 
several provinces and the Uzbeks were invading Khurasan. Moreover, the Ottomans had 
already occupied large areas of Iran; parts of Azerbaijan together with Tabriz, parts of 
Georgia and Qarabagh, Khuzistan, Shirvan and Erivan. At the end of the negotiations a 
peace treaty was concluded on 21 March 1590. By this means, twelve years of enmity 
between the two states had been terminated. But, for Iran, the conditions of the Treaty 
were almost devastating. According to them, Iran had lost Azerbaijan and Qarabagh 
                                                             
55 H.R. Roemer, “The Safavid Period”,p.252. 
56 Roger M. Savory, Iran under the Safavids, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980), p. 71-74. 
57 H.R. Roemer, “The Safavid Period”,p.264 
26 
 
along with Ganja, Shirvan and Daghistan, her possessions in Georgia, parts of Kurdistan 
and Luristan, Baghdad and Mesopotamia. Even though they had lost vast amount of 
lands, for Iranians the most humiliating condition of the treaty was that the Iranians 
should dispense with probating the first three Caliphs.58 
After evading the problems in the east, by 1603-4 Shah Abbas felt himself capable 
of fighting against the Ottomans. He conquered Azerbaijan, Nakhchivan and Erivan and 
defeated the Ottomans at Tabriz. After ensuing struggles, by 1607 the Safavids regained 
the territories which were demarcated with the Treaty of Amasya, in 1555. About two 
decades later, a new Safavid campaign was launched on Mesopotamia in 1623, as a 
result of which the Safavids were able to re-establish their control over the Kurdish 
territories of Daquq, Kirkuk and Shahrizor as well as Karbala and Najaf and surely 
above all they occupied Baghdad.59 
The Ottomans did not seize the opportunity of political vacuum that occurred in 
Iran just after the Shah Abbas I’s death in 1629. Because at that time Sultan Murad IV, 
who was very young, at the first stage, was not able to tackle with problems, such as 
revolts in northern Anatolia, Safavid invasions in Iraq and the murder of the Grand 
Vizier by Janissaries. But eventually the Sultan succeeded in concentrating power in his 
hands and put an end to the period of anarchy which lasted nearly ten years. 
 After settling internal affairs, Murad IV turned his face to the east, Iran. His main 
objective was to regain Baghdad, and for that purpose he dispatched Grand Vizier 
Hüsrev Pasha on Baghdad. At that time, Baghdad was contingent upon Safi Quli Khan, 
who was bent to hold out against the Ottomans. When Hüsrev Pasha encountered a 
heavy artillery bombardment, he conceded that attempt as a failure and retreated. 
Consequently, in the following four years, frontier skirmishes went on incessantly in 
which initiatives and outcomes were shifted from one side to another. In 1635 the 
Ottomans conquered Erivan and subsequently they marched on Tabriz but they could 
not be able to occupy it. Shah Safi I, in return, in the following spring mounted an 
attack against the Ottomans and re-conquered Erivan. At that point, the Safavids were 
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willing to parley with the Ottomans but the Sultan was reluctant to make peace. Because 
he was bent on re-conquering Baghdad, he launched a new campaign into Mesopotamia 
in 1638 and at the end of December he achieved his goal; Baghdad was again felt under 
the control of the Ottomans60.  
While intermittent struggles were continuing with the Ottomans, Shah Safi was 
tackling with the Moghul expansionism in the east. So he was forced to offer an 
agreement to stop these struggles. On May 17, 1639 a peace treaty was signed, on the 
plan of Zohab, near Qasir-ı Shirin, which ended the war that continued for over a 
century and established the boundaries which were to endure up to the present time. By 
this Treaty the dispute over boundaries of the Middle East was resolved: the Tigris- 
Euphrates basin and eastern Anatolia remained under the control of the Ottomans and 
on the other hand Caucasus remained in Iranian hands61.   
After the Treaty of Zohab, both sides abided by the terms of this Treaty, and 
afterwards there were no more wars between the Ottomans and Safavids for nearly 
eighty years.62From 1640 onwards to 1662 both the Ottomans and the Safavids sent 
only four missions to each others’ capitals. In the succeeding three decades this 
exchange was carried on. Apart from their congratulatory missions of 1667 and 1691, 
the Ottomans have dispatched envoys to Isfahan in 1684-1685. Although there was a 
mutual pacifism on both states in the late 17th century, these envoys were portent of the 
new crisis that would be a threat for the peace.63 
Moreover, the Treaty of Zohab provided the Ottomans convenience in the east 
and then they turned their face to west. In the sixteen years of continuous warfare 
                                                             
60 Martin Sicker, The Islamic World in decline: from the Treaty of Karlowitz to the 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), p.13-14. 
61 Stanford Shaw, “Iranian Relations with the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Century”, in The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 7 (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1991), p. 297.  
62 H.R. Roemer, “The Safavid Period”,p.285. 
63 Rudi Matthee, “Iran’s Ottoman Diplomacy During the Reign of Shah Sulayman 
I(1666-94)”, in Iran and Iranian Studies: Essays in Honor of Iraj Afshar, ed. Kambiz 
Eslami, (Princeton, NJ: Zagros, 1998), p.149. 
28 
 
following the Debacle of Vienna (1683-1699), while the Ottomans were waging fights 
against the European states, there did not arise any Iranian incursions on Ottoman lands, 
because, in the meantime, Iran was disturbed by several tribal struggles for royal 
succession. But on the other hand the Ottomans, by taking the advantage of an Afghan 
attack to Iran, engaged in several wars with the last Safavid Shah Tahmasb II and Nadir 
of Afshar, which continued almost twenty years.64  
During the Afghan attacks to Iran Shah Tahmasb II asked the Ottomans for help, 
however he did not receive any positive reply from them. After Isfahan was saved from 
the Afghans, Shah Tahmasb II asked the Ottomans to give the occupied territories back, 
however, the Ottoman Sultan would only accept his demand if the Iranians compensated 
the Ottomans’ expenditures during the occupation. Therewith the leader of the Safavid 
Army, Nadir, declared war against the Ottomans.65During the struggle at Hamadan 
Nadir repelled the Ottoman army back to Baghdad, and after refusing the Ottomans’ 
peace demand he gained some of the occupied territories back. But, in the meantime, 
the Afghans had caused disorder at Horasan so that he was forced to retreat. On the 
other hand, the Ottomans became reluctant to maintain warfare against Iran because 
following of the death of Ibrahim Pasha, the Grand Vizier, there arose internal disorder 
within the country. The root of the disorder was based on Istanbul’s need for reinforcing 
its legitimacy before the eyes of public because of the financial burdens due to 
modernization movements. While thereseveral fruitless campaigns werelaunched 
against Iran by the Ottomans, a revolt was prompted in Istanbul in 1730 which 
interrupted the preparations for a new campaign to Iran. It was a new initiative for Nadir 
to take back Iraq from the Ottomans, and he captured the regions four times between 
1732 and 174366. He was looking for an approach of Sunni Muslims to admit Shi’ite 
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Muslims as a “fifth madhhab”, or legal school of thought within Islam.67 With this 
attempt Nadir seemed to be as if he was trying to give an end to long-lasting religious-
based conflict between the two states, but on the other hand by capturing Iraq several 
times he wanted to seize religious legitimacy from the Ottomans. However, Shah 
Tahmasb II was in fright because of the ever growing successes and influence of Nadir, 
so in order to regain his power he declared war one more time against the Ottoman 
Empire. But at that time, the Safavid army was dealing with the Afghan revolt and so 
Shah Tahmasb II, without gaining any success, had to accept to make peace by which 
he conceded to give southern parts of Caucasia, which were under the possession of 
Iran, and some of the western provinces of Iran to the Ottoman Empire. Thus he lost 
most of the lands which were gained by Nadir. As soon as Nadir learnt the situation, he 
overthrew Shah Tahmasb II and enthroned Tahmasb’s little son, Shah Abbas II, in 1732 
and declared himself as regent. After Shah Abbas II’s death in 1736, Nadir exactly 
usurped the throne and by this means the Safavid reign in Iran, which lasted more than 
two centuries, ended.68 
Nadir was a member of Afshar tribe, one of the most prominent tribes of Iran. 
After gaining power as a regent, his main objective was to regain the territories which 
were lost during Shah Tahmasb II reign. Within three years, he recaptured all the 
territories that had been occupied by the Ottomans. In 1737, although he did not be able 
to capture Baghdad he conquered Tbilisi, Ganca and Yerevan. Besides, after defeating 
Russia, in 1735, he regained Baku and Debend with the Treaty of Ganca.69 After the 
death of Abbas II, he summoned a country-wide council and declared himself as the 
Shah of Iran.70  
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As the new shah, in 1736, he led a campaign against Qandahar and its conquest 
happened in 1738. Then, Nadir Shah, made his way to India and in 1739 the Indians 
were defeated, Mohammad Shah had to surrender to Nadir Shah. While returning to 
Persia, on his way back, Nadir Shah attacked Bokhara and Khwarazm, and having 
defeated the rulers of Turkistan, he was able to conquer the whole of Transoxiana. In 
1741, Nadir Shah led an army against the rebellious people of Dagestan, the Lezgis in 
particular. But after this two- years long fighting, he did not attain a victory, and had to 
withdraw without suppressing the revolt.71 
Apart from all these there was a flux and reflux kind of relationship between the 
Ottomans and the Iranians, during the Nadir Shah’s reign. In the summer of 1743, right 
after the Dagestan defeat, Nadir Shah led an expedition to Mosul, on his way he 
plundered Baghdad’s all harvest which then caused a deadly famine in this province. In 
the mean time, he met with a representative of Vali of Baghdad, Mehmed Agha, and 
suggested a religious agreement to the Ottomans by which Iran would become Sunni 
but in return the Ottomans should accept the Jafariyya as the fifth school of law, as 
equal as the four schools to which he Sunni Muslims obeyed. But his suggestion was 
not accepted by the Ottomans and used by them to legitimize the new war against Iran. 
After thirty days long siege of Mosul, Nadir Shah had lost his 30.000 men and thus 
having no more strength to stand, he retreated.72 In the course of Nadir Shah’s Mosul 
siege, there arose domestic rebellions in Iran. Soon after suppressing these rebellions, 
Nadir Shah again declared war against the Ottomans, but in the end the 1746 treaty 
confirmed the greement of the 1639 Zohab Treaty regarding the frontiers between the 
two countries.73 
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The assassination of Nadir in 1747 was followed by a period of peace that would 
last about thirty years between the Ottoman Empire and Iran74. Ottoman Sultans, Osman 
III (1754-57) and Mustafa III (1757-74), and grand viziers were reluctant to fight 
against the Iranians; this was not because they did not have opportunities for war, but 
because of pursuing a conscious policy to protect the empire from the kind of struggles 
that would diminish its sources and threaten its existence. On the other hand, Iran was 
dominated by anarchy in between 1750 and 1779 in which Afsharid, Zend and Qajar 
leaders were struggling for the throne.75 
During the last years of his reign Mustafa III had been at war with Russia and his 
successor Abdulhamid I had to confirm the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca with Russia that 
contained severe terms, in 1774. While the Ottomans were tackling with the Russian 
problem, in February-March 1774, Karim Khan Zand by using local dynastic struggles 
in the Kurdish areas of Shahrazur made several raids into eastern Anatolia and in March 
1775 this time by using the alleged maltreatment of Shi’i pilgrims to Karbala, 
interceded in the Mamluk political struggles in Baghdad; his main goal was to appoint 
his own candidate. Meanwhile by benefiting from the power vacuum in these areas, he 
besieged and captured Basra. In consequence of that, Abdulhamid I, declared war on 
Iran in June 1776. In the first instance, he confirmed the Empire’s connections with 
Azerbaijan and Georgia in order to prevent them from supporting Karim Khan. 
Additionally, it was a good chance for him to replace the Mamluk governors of 
Baghdad with regular Ottoman governors.76However, the struggles among the Mamluk 
and the regular Ottoman governors, prevented an effective campaign against Karim 
Khan, thus Basra remained in the Iranian hands.77Iranian possession of Basra lasted 
                                                             
74 Thabit Abdullah, A Short History of Iraq, (Harlow, England: Longman, 2010), p. 71-
77. 
75 Stanford Shaw, “Iranian Relations with the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries”, p.311. 
76 For further information about the Mamluk governors of Baghdad, see Ebubekir 
Ceylan, The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), p. 37-41. 
77 Stanford Shaw, “Iranian Relations with the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries”, p.311. 
32 
 
three years and ended with the death of Karim Khan in 1779 which caused an internal 
turmoil in Iran.78 
Karim Khan’s death was followed by usual anarchy and scramble for the throne in 
between the Zand and the Qajar dynasties. Eventually Aqa Muhammad Khan of Qajar 
was able to take charge and in 1796 he was crowned in Tehran.79 
 
2.1. Ottoman Iranian Relations during the Early Decades of the Qajar 
Dynasty 
The Qajars were one of the Turcoman tribes who lived mostly in Astarabad, 
Mazendaran and Tehran provinces of Iran and also spread out in Turkistan, Azerbaijan 
and Anatolia. The Qajars, partly settled and partly nomadic, as being one of the seven 
founding Turcoman tribes of the Safavid State, ruled Iran from 1796 to 1925.80 
During the Qajar Dynasty, relations between the Ottoman Empire and Iran were 
concentrated around three main issues: the first was the Caucasian territories which of 
both countries had several fights for, the second was the Iraq-ı Ajam where exist several 
holy shrines sacred for Shi’is and the last one consisted of the problems that emerged 
because of the constant movements of tribal populations throughout the frontier.81 
The reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839) coincided roughly with the reign of Fath Ali 
Shah (1797-1834) in Iran. This period was characterized by territorial conflicts that 
were ended with the Treaty of Erzurum of 1823. Iranian intervention across the 
Ottoman frontier although being intermittent, it was quite persistent. Fath Ali Shah had 
taken the advantage of Mahmud II’s distractions in Europe and at home, in addition to 
resistant local leaders near the Ottoman-Iranian frontier to the Sultan’s centralization 
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policy. From 1812 onwards the Iranians started to raid into the areas of Baghdad and 
Shahrazur and continued relentlessly even though the Ottomans sent missions of protest 
and demanded for compensation. On the other hand, Fath Ali Shah’s men overtly 
supported local leaders against the Ottomans and even helped the Baghdad Mamluks 
and the Muntefiqs, a local Arab tribe in the southern Iraq, against the Sultan. Their overt 
support to local leaders brought results and during the ravage of Van in 1817-1818, the 
Iranians were, in return, supported by some local Kurdish tribes. As a consequence, 
Mahmud II declared war against Iran in October 1820 that lasted almost three years. 82 
Both sides were tired of these constant struggles and a subsequent cholera epidemic was 
followed by a series of revolts within the Ottoman Empire. The standing army of the 
Ottomans, therefore, had to tackle with internal discord and was unable to send troops 
to help the eastern border provinces. Eventually both sides agreed on armistice83. On 
July 28, 1823 the Treaty of Erzurum was signed. With this Treaty, the peace treaty of 
1746 was reaffirmed and involved no changes in frontiers; abiding by the former 
agreements pertaining to pilgrims, merchants, the delivery of refugees, the free egress of 
all prisoners, and the presence of a minister at the individual courts, were accepted 
valid, and these stipulations were to be strictly observed.84 
However, although this was the reaffirmation of the former agreements and there 
was no change in the frontier, this treaty was not exact enough and gave rise to recurrent 
disputes. In between 1833 and 1842 a series of incursions took place by one side or 
other, and Iran’s intervention to Ottoman Iraq by claiming the protectorate over the 
Ottomans’ Shi’i population brought the two states to the brink of war.85 But with the 
mediation of Great Britain and Russia, in 1843 a mixed boundary commission was 
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formed in order to fix the frontier between the two states.86 As a result of four years 
long negotiations and researches a boundary agreement was produced and on May 31, 
1847 it was signed in Erzurum. Since precision was still lacking, emending of the 
contested claims was assigned to yet another commission again with the mediation of 
Britain and Russia. In terms of new detailed survey (1857-1865), the two states settled 
on a temporary frontier agreement. 87  However both states had plausible reasons for 
hesitating to define the frontier too precisely. On the one hand, the Ottomans did not 
wanted to lose large revenues that they collected from dependent tribes in the area. On 
the other hand the Shi’i rulers of Iran did not wanted to leave a region that contained 
prominent Shi’i shrines and being densely populated by the Shi’is, in the hands of a 
Sunni Sultan.88 
The summer and winter pastures of tribes on both sides of the frontier had for a 
long time been a source of tension and conflicts. In 1867, the ordinary movements of 
the Kurdish Mangur tribe from Iran back to Ottoman lands caused disquiet; indeed, they 
had gone unnoticed for decades. In time a sense of territoriality of both sides was 
certainly, developing. In 1873 Tehran claimed jurisdiction over Iranian residents in the 
Ottoman Empire in regard to Article 7 of the May 1847 Treaty of Erzurum. For Iran 
these trans-boundary movements created an overt mistreatment of the 1869 status quo 
convention. Although a series of agreements and conventions were signed between the 
two countries, territorial conflicts remained unsolved for a long time. In July 1873, a 
territorial dispute was settled in Pusht-i Kuh, skirts of Kandil Mountains facing Ottoman 
lands, by which both sides agreed to withdraw their troops in the area. Additionally, 
with the 1878 Treaty of Berlin the territorial status of Khotur district, east of Van, was 
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settled and the occupation of the Ottomans was ended which was lasting from 1849 
onwards.89 
 
2.2. Ottoman-Iranian Relations during the Hamidian Era 
Abdulhamid II’s foreign policy was essentially based on providing the external 
peace security vital for the implementation of domestic reorganization and regeneration 
which the Empire’s survival eventually depended.90 According to Roderic Davison, 
Ottoman foreign policy, in a sense, was very similar to its domestic policy. Because its 
main principle was to preserve independence and integrity of the Empire 
Starting his reign with a devastating Ottoman-Russian war of 1877-78 and as a 
result of this with an important territorial loss in the Balkans, Abdulhamid II had to 
drive his foreign policy’s route in a way that would provide the security of his domain. 
In succeeding years of this war, the Ottomans did not feel comfortable in relations with 
Iran, because in the course of the war Iran’s support to Russia was very well known by 
the Sultan and his officials. Moreover, after the war, Russia inserted article 60 into the 
Berlin Treaty putting an end to the conflict that bestowed the disputed territory of 
Khotur to Iran:91 
 “The Sublime Porte cedes to Persia the town and territory of Khotour, as fixed by 
the mixed Anglo-Russian Commission for the delimitation of the frontiers of Turkey 
and Persia.”92 
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Although the first years of Abdulhamid II’s reign Ottoman-Iranian relations had 
started and developed in an atmosphere of resentment, there was a common point which 
attracted these two countries around: Islam.  
The Iranians, while they, were politically ready to take side with the Ottoman 
Empire’s enemies, and on the other hand regarded the Ottoman Empire as model for 
modernization. Meanwhile, Istanbul had become a center of attraction for Iranian 
political refugees, dissidents, opposition groups and intellectuals. There was another 
confluence point; the Shi’i sacred places in Iraq, known as the Atabat. As the center for 
Shi’i ulama the Atabat maintained its importance as a religious authority, and in the late 
nineteenth century Atabat mujtehids became very effective in Iranian politics. This 
period coincided with the emergence of Pan-Islamic polities of the Ottomans in Iranian 
politics, especially among the ulama. During the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877-78 by 
distributing leaflets to Iranian pilgrims in the Hijaz, without mentioning any sectarian 
divergence the idea of importance of Islamic unity and Muslim brotherhood was 
underlined. This idea of Islamic unity and brotherhood was continued during the reign 
of Abdulhamid II and within the context of his Pan-Islamic policy, all moral 
possibilities and material sources were used according to changing conditions till the 
early 1880s.93 
With the intention of staving the adverse events off that occurred after the Berlin 
Treaty of 1878 and conducting amicable terms with Iran, Abdulhamid II took the 
initiative: In 1878, the Empire’s Teheran Envoy, Fahri Bey, had a meeting with Nasır- 
al din Shah in which both sides underlined the importance of facilitating consent and 
concord between the two Muslim states for their common interests against the Great 
Powers.94  
Abdulhamid was not content with the degree of amity between the two Muslim 
states which was lasting for a while. For him this was because of the impassive 
behaviors of the erstwhile envoys and from now on the Empire would do her best for 
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the sake of Islamic Unity.95 As a sign of this undertaking, the Empire had removed the 
restrictions which constrained visits of the Shiites’ to the Atabat.96This gesture of the 
Empire was recompensed by Iran: during the commemoration of the Karbala events in 
1878, for the first time, they blessed for the Abdulhamid II’s wealth and the Empire’s 
victory against her enemies after blessing for the Shah.97  
These reciprocal goodwill gestures continued until 1881: from this time onwards 
the issue of the Kurdish tribes’ bestriding the borderline, again began to trouble for both 
sides. They always took refuge at one state when they had trouble with the other and 
both states did not hesitate to use these tribes for their present purpose as against each 
other.98  
Shiism was another point of dispute between the two states. Iran used muchedtids/ 
ahund as a tool of policy making. In the midst of 1890’s, she intensified Shiism 
propaganda all around the Ottoman realm, but especially within borderline provinces of 
the Ottoman Empire, such as Baghdad and Basra. General social structure of these 
provinces was mainly based on tribes and the population was commonly Shii. 
Furthermore, throughout the nineteenth century, by virtue of the ahunds’ activities there 
occurred a growth in this Shi’i population, mostly due to conversion. For the Ottomans 
this was not only a religious threat, but it had also a political aspect. Because the Shi’is 
were regarded as potentially disloyal, their growth would change dramatically the 
demographic map of Ottoman Iraq that this meant a direct threat to the Ottoman 
authority in the area. For that purpose from the early 1890s onwards, various measures 
were taken in order to avoid the growth of Shi’ism99, which will be comprehensively 
explained in the third chapter of this thesis. 
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However, Abdulhamid II never gave up his objective of the religious 
rapprochement between the Sunni and Shi’i Islam. During the Tobacco Crisis of 1891-
92 in Iran, the Atabat became an important opposition center in the Iranian politics, and 
the mujtehids of the Atabat were engaged in Iranian internal affairs. This was a big 
chance for Abdulhamid II to unify Shi’is and Sunnis under the same umbrella and 
extend political influence over his subjects. For that purpose a prominent scholar of that 
time, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, was invited to Istanbul to form a committee which would 
work for the elimination of sectarian differences between the Muslims. But this act of 
Abdulhamid II was not very welcomed by the Iranian authorities and they demanded the 
deportation of Afghani. In response, the Iranians gave support to Armenian 
revolutionaries inside Iran and on the border. Under these circumstances Abdulhamid II 
had to give up his project and his relations with Afghani worsened. Thus, until his death 
in March 1897 Afghani was put under probation in Istanbul.100 
With the accession of Muzaffar al-Din Shah in 1896, the Ottoman-Iranian 
relations gained a new and cordial direction which would last for a few years. In the 
autumn of 1900, the Shah visited Istanbul, and Abdulhamid II treated him with respect 
and distinction.101 
From the first years of 20th century onwards, both countries were shaken by 
various internal events that would affect the direction of their relations. First, Iran 
encountered internal disorder that arose from the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-
1911 and right after the beginning of this movement the Ottoman army occupied several 
disputed territories on the frontier, from Bayazid to Vezne. These territories remained in 
the Ottomans’ hands until the Istanbul Protocol was signed on October 17, 1913. 102 
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CHAPTER III 
 
MARRIAGE AND CONSCRIPTION 
 
3.1. On the Way to Prohibition of Marriages  
The sectarian enmity between the Ottoman Empire and Iran took its roots from 
the very beginning of the 16th century. The rise of the Safavid state with sectarian claim 
of Shi’ism disquieted the Ottomans in both political and religious senses. They regarded 
the presence of a Shi’i state in their eastern border as a challenge to their political 
power. Thus they needed to define their own theory of empire based on orthodox Sunni 
Islam and the extinction of their Shi’i, heretic, neighbors on their eastern border. So, 
from the 16th century onwards the Ottomans issued several anti-Shi’i fetvas in which 
they regarded Shi’is as heretical, unorthodox and even infidel. One of those had been 
issued by Müfti Hamza, who was judge (kadı) of Istanbul in 1512, in which he 
identified Shi’is as infidels and heretics, and it was every Muslims’ duty to kill them. 
The most important aspect of this fetva for our research was that according to him, 
likewise the marriages amongst them, the marriages with others, were not legally 
valid.103 
From the point of this fetva it seems safe to search the main cause of prohibition 
of Sunni women- Shi’i men within the context of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh).  
According to the Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) the marriage of a Muslim woman with a 
non-Muslim man was prohibited. There are several verses of the Quran that support this 
idea of prohibition: “Do not marry your girls to unbelievers until they believe”104 and 
“if you ascertain that they (women refugees) are believers, then send them not back to 
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the unbelievers. They are not lawful (wives) for the unbelievers, nor are the 
(unbelievers) lawful (husbands) for them”.105 
 Because, in these kinds of marriages there was a threat that woman can convert 
and became an unbeliever. According to the general opinion, the husband would sooner 
or later invite his wife to his own belief. Whereas the wife would not stand up to her 
husband’s invitation and finally became an unbeliever.106 
Another important fetva pronounced by Ebussuud, the most prominent 
Seyhulislam during the age of Suleyman I and Selim II, in which marriage according to 
the Shari’a was prohibited with a heretic and who had married would be exposed to 
severe punishment. By this means the fetva of Ebussuud had confirmed and 
strengthened the Müfti Hamza’s pronouncement about the prohibition of marriages 
between the Sunnis and Shi’is.107 
During the 16th century the issuance of anti-Shi’i fetvas went hand in hand with 
the wars and political struggles for suzerainty between the Ottomans and Iranians. 
During the wars with Iran in accordance with fetvas the persecution of Shi’is was 
supported and the prohibition of marriages between the Sunnis and Shi’is was 
reasserted. In 1578, during the a Turkmen revolt in southeastern Anatolia, another fetva 
was issued which again underlined the importance of killing infidels and heretics and 
reaffirmed the prohibition of marriages between the Shi’is and Sunni Muslims.108 
While the Ottomans were declaring the Shi’is as heretics and infidels on the one 
hand, on the other hand were trying to depict them as a threat to the existence of the 
Empire and for the orthodox Muslim people by virtue of their anti-Sunni and 
unorthodox ambitions. The Ottomans did not come across such a big political and 
religious threat from the very existence of the Empire. They now have to establish a 
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strong theory of empire by which defined themselves as sole leader of Sunni orthodox 
Islam on the contrary Shi’is as infidels and heretics. According to Zarinebaf-Shahr in 
the 16th century the definition of heretics had built upon such a solid basis that there was 
for that reason no need to put out an official treatise on heresy which would introduce a 
prohibition of marriages.109 
In the 18th century, the Chief Müfti of Damascus promulgated a fetva about the 
prohibition of marriage between Sunnis and Shi’is. During the reign of Zand dynasty, 
the two states had struggles for the Basra province of the Ottoman Empire. At the end of 
these struggles, in order to justify their attacks the Ottomans declared the Zand as 
heretics.110 At this atmosphere local religious officials unearthed the prohibition of 
marriages between Ottoman women and Iranian men. From the second quarter of the 
18th century onwards the relationship between the two states took on a new dimension 
and therefore the reaffirmation of the prohibition also had a new character. The struggle 
for the possession of the disputed areas and the border regions and for gaining loyalty of 
the people had affected the decision which would be made on the prohibition of 
marriages.  
Before the 18th century there was no such a big amount of Iranian in Ottoman Iraq 
that could pose danger for the Ottomans. There were only Iranian merchants and other 
individuals who were seeking economic opportunities. From the 18th century onward 
Iranian ulama and students came to Iraq in huge numbers. There were several reasons 
that lay behind this influx: in 1722 Isfahan was captured by Sunni-Afghans and Nadir 
Shah while had been promoting Sunni-Shi’i rapprochement had expropriated many of 
the endowments financing Shi’I clergy in Iran. For that reasons the center of Shi’i 
learning had been removed from Iran to Iraq, first to Karbala then to Najaf. The Iranian 
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ulama used the opportunity of loose control of the Ottomans in the area which would be 
lasting till 1831.111  
The ever growing Shi’i presence in Iraq had made the Ottomans take remedial 
measures against this threat to their control in the region. Sultan Mahmud II (1808-
1839) was aware of the growth of Shi’is in number, so in order to obviate the problem 
he issued an imperial order about the prohibition of marriages with Iranians, in 1822. 
By the imperial order it was underlined that the prohibition of marriages with Iranians 
was effective as of ancient times. By emphasizing the principle of retroactivity of laws, 
the Sultan aimed to legitimize and strengthen the effect of the prohibition. According to 
the imperial order if the Muslims marry or make others marry, would be subject to 
disappointment both in this world and in afterlife. Getting married with an Iranian 
meant being an illegitimate because in the imperial order Iranians were regarded as 
persons of unknown lineage.112 Within the context of these statements the Sultan’s 
religio-political concerns can clearly be seen. However, his concerns would be sharing 
by his successors till the end of the Empire in varying degrees.  
After the issuance of the imperial order, the documents in the Ottoman Archive 
remained a bit silent and thus, it became difficult to describe how this law was 
implemented. However, I came across a petition which was written by the parents of a 
Sunni Ottoman girl in order to assert their permission his daughter’s marriage with an 
Iranian man. As it was understood from the petition Sunni girls could marry to Iranian 
men with permission of their parents: Because in the petition they said “like precedents, 
we consent to our daughter’s marriage with Iranian citizen, Celil Ağa”. But, on the other 
hand, although they had permitted the local headman (muhtar) did not accept to contract 
the marriage because they did not have certificate of approval which was issued by 
governmental authorities. So, they had to apply to Meclis-i Vâlâ in order to take 
certificate of approval.113 Because of the lack of documents we do not be able to know 
how this issue was solved and if there were or not similar issues.    
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3.2. Shi’i Influence in Iraq during the 19th Century 
During second half of the 19th century ever growing of influence and numbers of 
Shi’is in Iraq continued. From 1722 onwards, with the rise of the Shi’i kingdom of 
Awadh (Oudh) in north India the shrine cities of Iraq gained profit because of the 
financial remittances made by Awadh officials and other individuals for mujtahis in the 
cities during the years 1786-1844. Among these, the Oudh114 Bequest was the one of the 
most prominent donation that made for the shrine cities. It derived from the Third Oudh 
Loan which the British East India Company took from king of Awadh in 1825 for 
financing its war in Nepal. The seventy five percent of this Bequest was sent to 
mujtahids who lived in Najaf and Karbala in order to be distributed to poor people for 
the gain of religious merit.115 Their financial support was reinforced with the influx of 
huge numbers of Indians to Iraq from 1860s, after the annexation of Kingdom of Awadh 
by British.116 By these means the influence and numbers of Shi’is in Iraq was cemented 
which threatened the existence of powerful Ottoman administration in the region.  
The conversion of Iraq’s Sunni tribes to Shi’ism accelerated from 1831, after the 
Ottomans seized the direct control over Iraq. In parallel with the sedentarization process 
of the tribes and increasing centralization, newly settled tribes chose to convert Shi’ism. 
Especially during the second half of the 19th century conversion to Shi’ism gained 
momentum because of the Ottomans’ lack of social base in Iraq and until the late 19th 
century they did not realize the increase in the pace of conversions.117 
Religion as a piece in the state apparatus, have promoted and ideal of 
sedentarization and referred themselves more to the settled component than the nomadic 
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ones.118 Within the context of their approach to religion nomads and settled people can 
be separated. Because of the constant movement nomads do not have any sense of time 
and permanent residence as settled people have.119On the other hand, settled people 
were depended on time, schedule and place which a religion requires. So, when tribes 
intended to settle down, there possibly occur contradiction between them and settled 
people. Because the settled people unlike nomads had a sense of institutionalized 
religion and bookishness.120 Thus, the settled people undertake to civilize nomads and 
instill orthodoxy among them. The Ottomans, although they referred themselves as the 
sovereign of Islam, did not pay enough attention to the religious issues while they were 
settling down tribes.  
As reported by the governor of Basra the reason of the spread of Shi’ism among 
the tribes was that they were full with gloom of ignorance and far apart from the light of 
education and the fruits of civilization for many ages. However, in fact the people had 
converted to Shi’ism because of the lack of the orthodox Sunni imams who would instill 
them with true Islam that Iranian ulamas had leached into the tribes and infused their 
ideas. In addition to that these people were not aware of the necessities of the Sunni sect 
and did not have any religious authority who would teach them, they normally bent to 
Shi’ism.121 
 
         3.3 Prohibition Law of 1874 and Its Implementations 
It was in this environment the prohibition of marriages had been reaffirmed and 
strengthened by the Prohibition Law of Marriages between Iranians and Ottoman 
Citizens that promulgated on October 7, 1874. The Regulation consisted of three 
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articles, which showed the Empire’s demographic and political concerns about the 
provinces along Iranian borderline122.  
1. Marriages between Ottoman and Iranian citizens, as in olden times, are strongly 
prohibited. 
2. Those (officials) who are authorized to perform marriages and who act against 
the prohibition will be held responsible. 
3. If a female Ottoman citizen marries a male Iranian citizen in contradiction the 
prohibition, both woman and her children will be continued to be regarded as 
Ottoman citizens and charged to conscription, military tax, and all other 
financial obligations.  
According to Karen M. Kern, the Prohibition Law of 1874 was shaped as part of 
the shaping of nationality. Although there was a religious aspect, marriages between 
two states’ citizens were outlawed with regard to citizenship which underlined the 
connection between marriage and citizenship. This itself was an important part of the 
Empire’s centralization program123.  
The third article of this Prohibition Law did obviously contradict with the1869 
Ottoman Law of Nationality. Because according to 1869 Law if an Ottoman woman 
married to a foreigner she would acquire her husband’s citizenship.  
During the Hamidian Era, the prohibition of marriages with Iranians was 
reinforced in a strict manner in harmony with geopolitical affairs and daily policies. In 
this era, the main subject of this prohibition still stemmed from the ongoing Shi’i- Sunni 
religious debate. But actually, although taking many measures, it was in fact very 
difficult to prevent such illegal marriages. In 1887, the Council of Ministers issued a 
report which declared that imams and muhtars were not allowed to give certificates 
these prohibited couples and would be punished who contracted such illegal 
marriages124. For instance, the muezzin of Tomtom neighborhood of Tophane, Istanbul 
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Hafız Osman Efendi would be punished because of contracting the marriage of an 
Iranian man and an Ottoman woman125.  
 But this decision of Meclis-i Vala was not enough to forestall these marriages. 
This time couples started to apply local Iranian consuls to get marriage license. As a 
consequence in 1887 an Ottoman woman named Tuti succeeded to marry an Iranian 
man named Abdullah by getting a marriage license from the Iranian Consulate of 
Adana. Despite this license, the Ottoman government did not approv this marriage and 
asked both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Hariciye Nezareti) and the Population 
Registry Administration (Nüfus İdare-I Umumusi) to do what is necessary under given 
circumstances.126  
Another example, related to this issue, is a marriage which contracted by Iranian 
ahunds at the Iranian Embassy of Istanbul: an Iranian man named Halil married an 
Armenian woman who was an Ottoman citizen, and converted to Islam short time ago, 
named Hatice. After an inquiry, the Ministry of Gendarme (Zaptiye Nezareti) kept Halil 
under surety and guaranty until the Ministries of Interior and Foreign affairs gave the 
final decision about his situation.127While the inquiry was conducting, the Iran Embassy 
asserted that Halil and Hatice had married before the promulgation of Prohibition Law 
of 1874 and so Halil could not be arrested and expel from Ottoman lands. But, the 
Ottomans, as a result of inquiry, had decided the expulsion of Halil from Ottoman 
lands.128 Here and all other issues pertaining to marriage and conscription we would see 
that the Iranians would be trying to use legal gaps between the three Laws, i.e. Ottoman 
Citizenship Law of 1869, the Prohibition Law of 1874 and Conscription Law of 1886.  
In 1894, the Ministry of Interior received a petition signed by Ayşe Hanım, who 
had married with an Iranian man, Hasan. In her petition she was asking for justice to her 
husband that he wanted to acquire Ottoman citizenship but Iran vice consul of Adana 
had tortured him and confiscated his property. After an inquiry, Ministry of Interior 
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ascertained that there was no such an issue like torturing and confiscating and moreover 
they had married against the Prohibition Law so, they had to be punished: Hasan would 
be expelled to Iran and Ayşe Hanım would retain Ottoman citizenship status.129 
 
3.4. Marriage with British Citizens  
From the 1830s onwards, the British presence and influence in Iraq became very 
obvious. With the establishment of British India, they became the leading actor of the 
trade of Iraq and the Gulf. The Lynch Company took the concession of stream 
navigation on the Euphrates and the Tigris. They also constructed telegraph lines which 
connected Baghdad to India, Istanbul and Tehran. In addition to that, the influx of the 
British Indian pilgrims and students to the shrine cities of Iraq strengthened the British 
influence in the region.130 
However, the British use Oudh Bequest as a tool of influence and control over the 
Shi’i ulama in Iraq and even Iran. Thus, in order to determine who would be a mujtahid 
in the shrine cities, they manipulated Shi’ism itself. They, while trying to raise hatred 
and animosity between Shi’is and the Ottomans wanted to weaken Ottoman rule in Iraq. 
Meanwhile, they were aware of the Ottomans’ suspicion that they were financing Shi’i 
conversion.131 
It was in this environment we came across the issue of marriages between the 
British citizens of Iraq and the Ottoman women. This time, instead of Iranian Embassy 
we see British consuls-general of Baghdad was in charge of marriages. In 1898, British 
consuls-general of Baghdad wrote a petition to the Council of State (Şûra-yı Devlet) 
mentioning British citizen Indian Mehmed Ali did not allow marrying to an Ottoman 
woman by the local Ottoman authorities.  Although the prohibition of marriages 
between the Ottoman women and the Iranian men legalized, it was not exactly legalized 
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what would be done if the Ottoman women wants to marry with foreign citizens. After a 
long discussion between the legal and civil authorities it was decided that: according to 
the mandate of the Fetvahane which was issued on 5 April 1886, a Muslim Sunni 
woman could only get married to a Muslim Sunni man. If he was a Muslim Sunni, it 
was not important which state’s citizen he was. So, the Council of State asserted that 
after an inquiry if it was inclined that Indian Mehmed Ali was Sunni, there was no harm 
his marriage with an Ottoman woman.132 
Although the marriages between the Sunni Ottoman women and Sunni foreign 
citizens were allowed, it was decided what would happen in the marriages of Shi’i 
Ottoman women and Shi’i foreign citizens. According to the governor of Baghdad if 
these kinds of marriages were forbidden it would be inconvenient for the enlistment.133 
In response to question of the British consuls-general of Baghdad about the same issue, 
Grand Vizier wrote to Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the prohibition of marriages with 
Shi’i men would be retained even though these were British citizens.134 
 
3.5. Sons in Arms 
In the 19th century, creating citizens was one of the major concerns of the 
monarchies which endeavored for centralization. The citizen as a member of a given 
community was obliged to pay taxes and perform military service. In return for these 
obligations citizens’ common wealth, security and social stability was guaranteed by the 
state. However, military service is a citizen obligation that conscription system was 
embodiment of the idea of citizen obligation for national defense135. 
Universal conscription system to build up a standing army was first used in the 
time of American and French revolutions. In August 1793, French state declared that 
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every citizen was obliged to serve in the military service. The length of the military 
service was eight or more years which caused economic burden in France because of 
the lack of young labor which transferred to the front. In 1814 the Prussian state issued 
a law of conscription, which was inspired from the French system, where conscripts 
were required to serve one or three at the front lines, followed by a period in the 
reserves, and finally service in the militia, which was only resorted to only at the time of 
warfare136. 
Series of defeats, inflicted by Mehmed Ali Pasha on Ottoman troops were the 
milestone for the Ottomans to think about the creation of a standing army. Like France, 
the Ottomans were in economic burden due to lack of young and qualified labor that 
spent most of his life in the front. So in Gülhane Rescript, it was stated that, with the 
aim of agricultural and industrial florescence the length of the military service would be 
reduced to four or five years.137 
For creating a universal military system, the Ottomans established in 1844 the 
Nizamiye army by taking the Prussian army as a model. At the beginning the length of 
the military service for conscripts (muvazzaf) was five years, but in due course it was 
reduced first to four and than three and at last two. After active service conscripts and 
those who did not draw the lots served as reservists (redifler) for seven years. In 1848, 
the Regulation for Military Conscription (Kur’a Nizamnamesi) was issued and more 
detailed regulations were specified for the conscription system. In August 1869, these 
regulations were reviewed and revised and a new three-tiered system was found. 
According to the 1869 Regulation, the regular army (Nizamiye) soldiers were to serve 
for four years. Reservists, while serving seven years, now were to serve four years. 
Finally, there were guards (mustahfız), serving eight years, who did not fight at the front 
but resorted to maintain law and order at a time when regular and reserve armies were at 
the front. In 1871, a new Conscription Law was promulgated to codify the whole 
                                                             
136 Jan Lucassen and Eric Jan Zürcher, “Introduction: Conscription and Resistance. The 
Historical Context,” in: Erik J. Zürcher, Arming the State:Military Conscription in the 
Middle East and Central Asia,1775-1925 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), p. 7-10.  
137 See Tobias Heinzelmann, Heiliger Kampf oder Landesverteidigung? Die Diskussion 
um die Einführung der allgemeinen Militärpflicht im Osmanischen Reich 1826-1856 
(Frankfurt a.M: Peter Lang, 2004). 
50 
 
system of recruitment. This Law prevailed until the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 
with some amendments in 1879; after defeat in the war with Russia.138  
According to the amendments of 1879 the length of military service was increased 
to six years, of which three were spent under arms and three in the active reserve. 
Duration of serving as redif was reduced from eight to six years, of which the first three 
years would be classified as vanguard (mukaddem) and the last three years as rear (tali). 
The length of the service with guard (mustahfız) was again reduced to six years139.  
           
3.6. The Conscription Law of 1886 and Its Implementation 
In 1886 a new Conscription Law was promulgated. According to this Law the 
duration of military service remained six years and length of redif service was again 
brought up to eight years and lastly serving as guard (mustahfız) was six years. In other 
words, the man who served in the respective order would be regarded as fulfilled his 
military obligation140.  
Apart from these more or less similar regulations there is something noteworthy 
which makes Law of 1886 unique among others. In the 32nd article it was indicated that 
“citizens of foreign states who reside in Ottoman lands would not be obliged to perform 
military service except residents who held Iranian citizenship”.141 Because of this article 
there was a long-term controversy between the Ottoman and the Iran states which was 
derived from mostly demographic, religious and political concerns of each state. 
To build a standing national army, human factor is very important. So states need 
to determine exact numbers of their citizens and of course the amount of the young 
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population within their domains. In the 19th century Ottoman population witnessed a 
serious collapse due to the loss of territory and disastrous wars. For this reason it 
became an important issue to retain remaining the population. According to the 
Prohibition Law of 1874, children who were born from the marriages between an 
Iranian man and an Ottoman woman would be regarded as Ottomans and the woman 
would not acquire her husband’s citizenship.  
Just after the promulgation of Ottoman Conscription Law on 25 October 1886, 
there were a series of objections by the Iranian government. Their objections were 
focused on the 32nd article of this law. According to 32nd article of the law all foreign 
citizens who resided in Ottoman lands would be exempted from the military service 
except Iranians. For the Iranian ambassador this article was related to the 3rd article of 
Prohibition Law of 1874 and they had already protested it. But, the Ottomans had again 
brought to the forefront this humiliating issue by the 32nd article which contradicted 
with the international law asserting that sons were subjected to their fathers and wives 
were subjected to their husbands. Thus, the Iranians requested the abrogation of the 32nd 
article otherwise they would put it to rest.142 Furthermore, there was another point that 
the Iranians protested: demands of the Iranians who wanted to acquire Ottoman 
citizenship would not be accepted because they could possibly request this only for 
getting married to Ottoman women. On the other hand, if the Iranians were naturalized 
they would not be allowed to get married for one year and if they got married against 
the law they would also be expelled to Iran. For the Iranians this issue was in 
contradiction with the 3rd article of Ottoman Citizenship Law which asserting that, 
foreign citizens who lived in Ottoman lands for five years could acquire Ottoman 
citizenship. But, for the Ottomans after their naturalization the Iranians would become 
Ottoman citizens and this issue would be the Ottoman state’s internal affair.143 
People who acted against the Prohibition Law would be expelled from Ottoman 
lands and they could take their families with them. But it was experienced that these 
people returned to Ottoman lands soon afterwards they were expelled. As a result of this 
movement, their sons, as their Iranian fathers, would not be obliging to perform military 
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service. According to The Military Inquiry Commission’s report, these kinds of families 
increased in number especially throughout the frontier provinces, i.e. Baghdad, Karbala, 
Najaf, Basra and Mosul. In relation to this issue, The Commission’s another concern 
was about the decrease of Sunni population in the aforementioned provinces. For them, 
if the necessary regulations were conducted very carefully to avert the prohibited 
marriages, there would be no issue pertaining to increase in the birth rate of this kind of 
children.144 To take more effective measures the Commission, in order to inquire about 
the demographic structure of the area, asked for the commanders of the 4th and 6th 
Armies and the governors of Baghdad, Basra, Erzurum, Van and Mosul provinces.  
In his reply the governor of Baghdad it was asserted that in order to desert from 
the military service people claimed Iranian citizenship, many of whom could not be 
registered yet and although the Iranian consuls-generals asked for the registry they did 
not share the information. Nevertheless, there were about 20.000 people who were 
living in Baghdad for a long time that they were originally Iranian and their mothers 
were Ottoman. If these were put aside, there would be many others that claiming Iranian 
citizenship: because in Ottoman Iraq there were people, many of whom migrated and or 
fled to Baghdad from Iran and paid homage to the Ottoman state when the people of 
Ottoman Iraq were not obliged to perform military service. However, if this law did not 
have a retroactive effect, there would many of whom that would claim bogus Iranian 
citizenship in order to prevent their sons from military service. Furthermore, by the 
Prohibition Law of 1874 the principle of retroactivity of laws had been adopted that the 
marriages between Ottoman women and Iranian men was forbidden since time 
immemorial. So, according to governor before making an exact decision on this issue, it 
had to be determined that what the main cause behind their claim was and how long 
they have been living in Ottoman lands. For that purpose, he asked for the center to be 
entrusted with full authority to take a detailed census and persuasion of the Iranian 
consuls-generals for consenting during the census.145 
According to the report of the 6th Army the number of the people who would 
possibly claim Iranian citizenship was not certain but there would be many Ottoman 
                                                             
144 BOA, Y.A.HUS, 212-24, 29 January 1888.  
145  BOA, İ.MMS 97/4111, 26 January 1888. 
53 
 
women, many of whom would prefer to marry with Iranian men in order to make their 
sons exempt from military service. In addition to all these there were 77 Iranian people 
in the Erzurum Province, 52 in the Mosul Province and 16 in the Hakkari Province. As 
it was understood from these reports Iranian citizens were mostly resided in the 
Baghdad Province and to avert the increase such peoples in number, they had to be 
expelled immediately after they got married against the prohibition. By the virtue of 
their expulsion there would be decrease in the number of future marriages and there 
would not be any problems on the recruitment issue.146  
The recommendations of the Military Inquiry Commission were debated in the 
Council of Ministers and it was decided that the people who had married against the 
prohibition would be immediately expelled and the imams or local headmen (muhtar), 
who were responsible for the marriages, would also be punished. First and foremost, 
civilian and judicial authorities must act according to the right and good of the whole 
Ottoman citizens in order to prevent the eagerness of the Ottomans to claim bogus 
Iranian citizenship. After their expulsion if they left their sons in Ottoman lands, these 
sons would be obliged to perform military service when they turned 20. In addition to 
that if they return soon afterwards their expulsion to Iran, their sons would also, like 
who stayed in Ottoman lands, be obliged to perform military service when they turned 
20. 147 On the whole, these recommendations were evaluated by the Sultan and 
approved on April 18, 1888.148 Furthermore, on 28th June 1888, a circular letter was 
written to all provinces which clarifying that the sons would not be obliged to military 
service if they were born before the promulgation of Conscription Law of 1886. The 
same circular letter, above all, contained additional measures to the previous irade; the 
aforementioned measures was imposed for whom had no ambiguity in their Iranian 
citizenship status, but on the other hand there were several people who had migrated 
and settled in Ottoman lands long time ago and obtained “denizen” status. So, after 
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inquiring their property and indicating their status if there was still an ambiguity, these 
kinds of people would also be suspended from Ottoman lands.149 
As in the decision making process of this implementation, there arose several 
problems while putting it into practice. In the case of Arisan family, the governor of 
Beirut province had difficulties to make decision on recruiting this family’s sons. 
Because the Iranian men of the family had married to Ottoman women and they had 
three sons whom had to be recruited in the first period of enlistment of 1887. The 
governor had two telegrams from the commander of 5th Army in which he ordered that 
according to the directions of Commander-in- Chief (Serasker) three sons of the Asiran 
family would be obliged to perform military service when they turn 20 because as per 
the 3rd article of Prohibition Law they had to be regarded as Ottoman citizens. Although 
these three sons were in the first period of enlistment of 1887, one of them, Emin, did 
not show up in the final military roll-call and he was now evasion of enlistment. Thus, 
he had to surrender otherwise he would forcibly be enrolled. But, on the other hand, the 
governor of Beirut was in a tight situation: because according to the circular letter that 
was issued on June 28, 1888 the sons would be exempted from the military service if 
they were born before the promulgation of Conscription Law of 1886 but the 
commander was ordering the opposite.150 As a result of months-long correspondences 
the Commander-in-Chief clarified the issue: he again underlined that “the sons would 
be exempted from the military service if they were born before the promulgation of 
Conscription Law of 1886” and he added that the length of the Asiran family’s 
residence in Ottoman lands had to be indicated and after that if there was no ambiguity 
in their Iranian citizenship they would be subjected to aforementioned implementation 
otherwise if they had migrated to Ottoman lands long time ago and became “denizen” 
they were obliged to perform military service.151 
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3.7. Fear of Conscription: Issuance of Population Bulletins 
Iran never gave up trying to profit by the legal gaps on the citizenship status of 
women who had married to Iranian men and their sons. In 1903 they were now 
manipulating the statement in the circular letter of 1886 and claiming that the Ottoman 
women who had married to Iranian men and their sons who had been born before the 
promulgation of Conscription Law of 1886 must be regarded as Iranian citizens. The 
statement was, certainly, related to recruitment was not pertaining to anything about the 
citizenship. The triggering factor that lay behind this was that in Kazimiye, a sub-
district of the Baghdad Province, a register wanted to be taken in order to indicate the 
certain numbers of these kinds of women and their sons. During the registration 
Ottoman officials issued population bulletins to everybody. But the population bulletins 
had same meaning with the enlistment for that people. So, the Grand Vizier asked 
Ministry of Interior for getting in touch with the provinces and ascertains this issue.152 
According to the circular letter which was sent by the Ministry of Interior to the 
provinces, on the prohibition of marriages between the Ottoman women and Iranian 
men the principle of non-retroactivity of laws would not be executed and thus, the sons 
whom were born both before and after the promulgation of Conscription Law of 1886 
and their mothers would be regarded as Ottoman citizens and population bulletins 
would be given both of them.153 
As reported by the General Staff (Seraskerlik), in 1907, there were still many 
men, whom did not registered and not given population bulletins in the Baghdad, Basra 
and Mosul provinces. If they did not register anymore, there would be an increase in the 
numbers of who would claim bogus Iranian citizenship in order to desert from the 
military service.154Thereupon, the Ministry of Interior again issued a circular letter in 
which it was ordered that all the officials must show ultimate attention not to leave these 
men out of registration and issue population bulletins to them.155 
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In response to the Iran’s claims and protests, the Ministry of Interior informed the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that although these men, who was registered and given 
population bulletins, were inducted they were claiming Iranian citizenship by applying 
to vice consuls of Iran. So, Iranian government must be acquainted in the manner of 
these men would be inducted unless proved otherwise by the Iranian government.156 As 
stated in the letter which was written by Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of 
Interior, he received information that there were these kinds of men in the Canik 
Province and additionally he had asked the governor of Trabzon for detailed 
information.157 
During the census the people, who had an ambiguity on their citizenship status, 
were subjected to the inquiry by both the administrative authorities and police force. As 
reported by the governor of Ankara, Sheikh Mustafa, who lived in the Haymana sub-
district, had been arrested because of the ambiguity on his citizenship status. According 
to the inquiry of the local administrative authorities he had come to Haymana from 
Savuç Bulak through Adana twenty years before without any travel certificate and 
population bulletin except an Iranian passport which was given by the Adana vice 
consul of Iran. After the inquiry of the police forces his status was clarified: he had 
come to Haymana five years before and during his visit he got married to an Ottoman 
woman, named Zeynep. Abidin Efendi, had performed their marriage without asking his 
hometown and population bulletin only with the approval of the bride’s father. One year 
after, however, it was realized that he was an Iranian citizen. But, in addition to that he 
had a bogus population bulletin indicating that he was an Ottoman citizen who lived in 
Suleymaniye district of the Baghdad Province. After an investigation it was understood 
that this bogus bulletin was issued and given by Hacı Osman, who lived in Bostan 
Hoyuk village of Haymana, in order to be shown by the Sheikh Mustafa when it was 
realized that he was an Iranian citizen. Although he was arrested, the governor of 
Ankara asked the Ministry of Interior for the final decision.158 In his reply, the Minister 
asserted that according to the previous implementations he had to be expelled to Iran. 
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But, on the other hand, expulsion of anyone would not be pursuant to Kanun-ı Esasi 
anymore, so the new regulations were needed to be done in the long run.159 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
WANDERING AROUND THE BORDER 
 
Early modern states were generally regarded their subjects as the potential 
revenue source, thus their aim was to provide security of them. But, on the contrary the 
modern centralized states’ main objective was to create a monolithic community by 
classifying and generalizing its subjects and subduing the uncontrollable and 
unrestrainable ones. For this purpose states by taxing people and property, conducting 
literacy campaigns, recruiting soldiers and launching universal schooling made their 
intervention visible in the eyes of their subjects. By the virtue of all these operations 
they achieved to identify, record, aggregate, indoctrinate and control the people under 
their suzerainty.160  
All modern states wanted to expand the tools of administrative discipline, related 
to the state or organized religion, to the areas that remote from the central authority. 
This administrative and cultural process was called as “internal colonization” by John 
C. Scott that defines the imperial project of the Ottoman Empire.161Within this context, 
the Ottomans’ colonization of their periphery meant, first and foremost, transforming it 
into an entirely governed and economically productive area. In accordance with this 
purpose, they moved loyal populations to the frontier and relocate or repelled disloyal 
populations, opened frontier lands for agriculture and made cadastral surveys.162 
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From the last decade of 17th century the Ottoman state undertook a policy for the 
settlement of its nomadic population. At the beginning the state’s objective was to settle 
these groups to abandoned and forlorn parts of Anatolia in order to provide prosperity 
and introduce agriculture to these areas. Thus, it would be possible to end the 
continuous struggles between the nomadic and the settled population.163 
At this juncture, this approach of settlement for a pre-modern empire seems more 
naïve and pragmatic than the intentions and activities of a modern, centralized state over 
its nomadic components. Modern state-crafters’ aimed to create and extend spheres of 
public authority or neutralize the non-state spaces. Within this context the Ottoman state 
needed to develop a policy by which means it would be possible to strengthen its power 
on the region, i.e. tribal zone, and integrate it into its modern state building project.164 
By the Tanzimat reforms, the Ottoman state aimed to reorganize provincial 
administration, thus the sedentarization of the nomadic tribes was a part of this process. 
Sedentarization contained both the top-down state policies of coercion and bottom-up 
strategies of mediation with the local leaders.165 For example, in 1632 and 1633, several 
imperial orders were issued by Murad IV by which the hereditary nature of the Kurdish 
tribal chiefdoms would be strengthened and in addition to that the governors and local 
military commander would not be allowed to harass and abuse the Kurdish tribes. It was 
in this environment, the leaders of these kinds of tribes became as powerful as that 
could not be controlled. So, from the first third decade of the 19th century, the Ottoman 
state felt the need of restraining the growing independence of local leaders and for this 
purpose the Fırka-ı Islahiye was established, in 1863-6. It was a mobile military force 
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whose task was to control and sedentarize the nomadic tribes, especially in southeastern 
Anatolia.166  
There were other regularizations which were not directly pertaining but paving the 
way to sedentarization of tribes. The application of the Land Code of 1858 and 
particularly the Provincial Law of 1864 accelerated the process of sedentarization and 
de-tribalization, by enhancing central power over the tribal periphery.167It was also 
aimed that the state would also be able to expand its control over its governors in the 
provinces. Previosuly, the power of governors had been extended with an imperial order 
dated 1852 that provided more power over their subordinate officials and over the sub-
divisions of the provinces. Because of this the provinces were exposed to 
maladministration of some of  these powerful governors. By the virtue of Provincial 
Law some degree of local participation was provided which could solve administrative 
problems and help to accomplish the official aim of establishing an amalgamated 
society in the empire.168 
The promulgation and application of these two laws coincided with the border-
making process of the mixed boundary commission, formed by the delegates of 
Ottoman, Iran, Britain and Russia states, in between 1843 and 1865. These two laws 
had paved the state the way for creating a more legible and more governable society and 
on the other hand the boundary-making process provided not only mapping and 
demarcation of the territory but also to map and classify the people within. At that time 
both the Ottoman Empire and Iran faced with a period of transition from borderlands to 
“bordered land”.169During this transition or transformation new identities appeared 
which were needed to be defined; this included the peoples who possessed the lands on 
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either side of these borders. However, at the same time, their relations with one another 
and with the state had to be controlled. All these achievements enabled the states to 
gather more information about and thus monitor the activities and movements of these 
nomadic peoples. While having more information about them the states had the 
opportunity to collect taxes and recruits for the regular army from the peoples who 
otherwise were reluctant to cooperate.170  
Above all, these gradual steps gave a chance to the state to introduce the sultan as 
a higher authority than the local chiefs. Most of the local peoples, especially the 
nomads, did know neither about the Sultan nor the central administration. Being in a 
major distance from the center they were used to live without being under any 
jurisdiction and were i.e. isolated. From the 19th century onwards, they had become 
vulnerable to state intervention; for the state they were now more accessible and 
governable. Thus they would easily be turned to a population of loyal citizens.171 
Theoretically all these seemed feasible but when it came to the implementation it 
was not an easy task for the state; because the population of concern mostly consisted of 
pastoral nomads. Their way of life was primarily based on seasonal migration from low 
and river valleys to high mountains’ peak or vice versa. They were always wandering 
around the frontier in order to exploit seasonal pastures. There were also other reasons 
which triggered their movement; political factors such as demarcation international 
boundaries, local governmental restrictions, and a desire to avoid taxation and 
conscription; economic factors such as the presence of markets and willingness of 
sedentary cultivators to lease potential pasture to nomadic populations. Although their 
movements, was sometimes, regarded as the territorial conquest, for nomads gaining 
free access to a place was more important than occupying it.172 
                                                             
170 Janet Klein, The Margins of the Empire, p.23. 
171 Thomas Kühn, “An Imperial Borderland as Colony:Knowledge Production and the 
Elaboration of Difference in Ottoman Yemen 1872-1918”, The MIT Electronic Journal 
of Middle East Studies Vol. 3 (2003), p.9. 
172 Rada Dyson-Hudson & Neville Dyson-Hudson, “Nomadic Pastoralism”, Annual 
Review Of Anthropology, Vol.9 (1980), p.16-18. 
62 
 
Additionally, the social structure was basically based on decency and kinship; 
therefore they paid homage to each other or to chiefs. Nomads, because of shifting 
residence and tribespeople due to their personal allegiance to each other or chiefs often 
created troubles to officials of sedentary states whose main objective was to control and 
classify them together.173 
Due to their constant movements and ambiguous loyalty to neither state, both the 
Ottoman and Iranian governments had troubles to determine their permanent residences 
and thus their citizenships. As in the case of former wars between the two states, in the 
19th century, they now were again looking for catching each other off guard in order to 
bring these groups into the fold. During that century the tribes were roaming along the 
border mostly because of the political vacuum in the area, dissatisfaction from the 
inconsistent policies of both governments and occurrence of religious struggles among 
them. For instance in1894 a Sunni tribe which lived in a sub-district along the northern 
border of Iran, wanted to migrate to Ottoman lands because they were suffering from 
the oppressions of the Shi’is.174 In the same year the Shekak Tribe had to stay under 
heavy snow for twenty days long, because the Ottoman government had not yet decided 
where to settle this tribe down. They desperately turned back to Iran to stay temporarily 
until their place of residence was decided and nevertheless they retained their allegiance 
to the Ottoman Empire.175 In both cases the government had planned to settle these 
tribes far from the border, i.e. 8 or 10 hours distant, because if they stayed close to 
border, they would possibly get in touch with Iran and shift their allegiance.   
 
           4.1. Ambivalent Belongings: The Bilbas Case 
 The Bilbas tribe was one of the nomadic tribes of the Empire, which lived in the 
Köy Sancak district of Mosul Province. They were regularly migrating to Lahican for 
summer pastures and in addition to these they also had other winter and summer 
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pastures in the Savuç Bulak district of Iran. Due to their constant movements among 
these areas, the possession of Savuç Bulak and Lahican and the citizenship status of this 
tribe caused always disputes between the two states.176 
 Lahican was a township (nahiye) of Raniye sub-district that was connected to 
Shahrizor district of Mosul Province.177 As a fine open land lying on the foot of the 
Kandil Mountains it was plentifully watered, and having a rich fertile soil, it was very 
suitable for agriculture. Thus, it became the regional destination and had been settled at 
different times by tribes subject to either state. The Zerza, the Baban, the Mikri and 
lastly the Bilbas tribe had the possession of the territory; in 1838, although the Mikris 
were the proprietors of the land, it was inhabited mostly by the Bilbas, who paid 
annually 1000 tomans to the Mikris as the rent of the land.178 
The district of Savuç Bulak was divided into two main administrative units: One 
of them was called as “Asıl (Major) Mukri where sedentary Mukri and Debokri tribes of 
Kurds lived. The second one was where the nomadic Bilbas tribe spent their summers. 
There were also other tribes who were staying permanently in the Iranian Land: one of 
them was the Mengurs, mostly settled and known for their nerve and bravery and others 
were the Piran and the Mamesh.179In 1905 the Savuç Bulak district was occupied by the 
Ottoman troops and remained under the control of the Ottomans until the Istanbul 
Protocol was signed on October 17, 1913. 180 
The Bilbas tribe, as a nomadic tribe confederation, contained twenty five sub-
groups that some of them lived in Koy Sancak and Raniye sub-districts and some in 
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Persian territory. The three prominent sub-groups were the Piran, the Mengur and he 
Mamesh; they consisted of respectively twelve, five and eight sub-groups. While the 
Mengur lived mostly in Pesve, in Lahican; the Mamesh lived in Terkush and Lala, 
villages in Lahican; the Piran continued to wander around and pasture their flocks in 
summer along the Persian frontier, and on the approach of winter went to the warm 
pastures of Beitush and Germiyan, on the banks of Lesser Zab.181 As a confederation 
they certainly had a chief, but his status was titular that he was overlord of only five or 
six villages.182 
The Bilbas tribe was known for their bravery and devoutness by the Ottomans; 
they had 7-8.000 mounted and armed men who were confessionally Sunni Muslims of 
the Shafi sect, and therefore they were welcomed by the state. But on the other hand, 
they loved their independence and were difficult to be controlled. Because of their 
devotion of constant movement they usually came into conflict with the state officials: 
in the summer of 1822 they attacked Tabriz and plundered agricultural populations. In 
the winter, when they came back to Köy Sancak, Ali Bey, the governor of Baghdad at 
that time, ravaged and plundered the tribe to earn reputation. But his violence act against 
the tribe did not deliver what was expected of it: the Bilbas tribe chose to take refuge 
and be loyal to Iran. 183 However this situation was not peculiar to them because in the 
late 1820s there were frequent public complaints about the local governors’ unjust and 
arbitrary administrations.184 In order to obviate their permanent subjecthood to Iran, the 
Sultan ordered that, the Bilbas tribe should be resided in Erbil and every measure must 
be taken in order to gain loyalty to the Empire.185 
Due to the lack of precision of the border along Lahican and Savuç Bulak, this 
area became open to power struggles among the two states. From 1885 onwards the 
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Iranians had started to attack and plunder Lahican and finally by capturing the district 
they erected some buildings on it. This time the aggrieved party was the Bilbas: 
throughout 1889, the Ottoman government received a series of telegrams from the 
leader of the tribe, Emin Bey, and his men in which they were listing their complaints 
about the Iranians. 186After the capture of Lahican by the Iranians they had difficulties to 
provide their daily needs and were unable to feed their herds because they did not have 
any other properties and lands except Lahican. Furthermore, their sub-groups had 
already migrated to Iran and only 1000 households remained in Ottoman lands. On the 
top of it, Iranian officials were demanding sum total taxes of the whole tribe from the 
remaining1000 households. Thus there arose grievances, combined with the 
circumstances of famine among the tribe member and they found no way out except for 
seeking the help of the Sultan. But they could not be able to receive an immediate reply 
because this was not a unilateral issue: on March 3, 1890 the Grand Vizier asked for the 
military inspection throughout the borderline. 187 
On July 17th, 1890, the General Staff (Seraskerlik) wrote a detailed report to the 
Grand Vizier, which was explaining the present situation of Lahican and the borderline. 
According to this report, because of the lack of the precision along the borderline, there 
were old and on-going disputes and therefore it was difficult to define which country 
had the possession of Lahican. But, on the other hand, this area was within the uti 
possidetis and Lahican was standing on the Ottoman side of the borderline.188 
In addition to the disputes pertaining to the borderline, there was another aspect of 
the Bilbas issue concerning the 19th century Ottoman center and the periphery relations. 
Although the modernization process of the Empire had a top-down character, the center 
had some difficulties in maintaining authority over its provincial governors. In time, the 
provincial governors became more and more autonomous even though the center tried 
to reduce their power. It is possible to see its effects on the Sultan’s imperial order; the 
Iranians had attacked and captured Ottoman lands as retaliation for the Ottoman 
governors’ violent acts against them. Furthermore, the center was not informed about 
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the situation and poor conditions of the Bilbas tribe until their leader sent a telegram to 
the Grand Vizier. In order to solve this problem, an official investigation was launched 
by which the governor or the officer, who was in charge of during the capture, would be 
determined and then be punished. 189 But due to the lack of documents and any other 
evidences it is impossible to about the outcome of this investigation.  
Until 1894 historical evidences about the Bilbas tribes are silent. But from this 
time onwards the Bilbas issue re-emerged. As reported by Abdullah Pasha, the 
commander of 4th Army, this capture issue had now became an issue of loyalty and 
citizenship. Indeed, Lahican territory was used as a summer pasture by the Bilbas tribes 
for the last 3-400 years. But in the last 30 or 40 years, the Ottoman government did not 
send any administrative or military officer to the area and this situation had caused the 
capture of summer pasture of the tribe by Iranians in the winters. The Iranians were not 
contented with only capturing the area, additionally with military and monetary support 
they were able to bring the Mamesh tribe into the fold, and settled them in Pesve, 
neighborhood of Lahican.190 
 In 1830s the Mamesh were forcibly settled in Pesve by the Iranian government. 
The Ottoman governor of Rawanduz, a neighborhood of Lahican, in order to turn them 
back attacked the Mamesh and killed their leaders. This violent act brought the Mamesh 
fully loyal to Iran. In 1858, Pesve became a part of Iranian land, and its usufructary 
rights were delivered to the agha of the tribe in exchange of 1000 tomans that 200 
tomans of it would be the salary of him and the remaining sum would have been 
collected annually. This attitude of Iranian government made Iranian side more 
attractive to Ottoman tribes which were agonized under the violent control of Ottoman 
officers.191 By this means the Mamesh tribe, including 400 households became Iranian 
citizens. They were now settled and therefore by increasingly adapting agriculture and 
they passed from a nomadic to sedentary life.192 
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The favourable conditions that were provided by Iran to the Mamesh tribe had 
affected the future decisions of the Bilbas tribe on shifting their allegiance from the 
Ottoman Empire to Iran. Although Emin Agha, had sent a series of telegrams to the 
center in 1890 he had no response to his complaints for four years. Because of that, in 
1894 they had to contend for an armed struggle against Iranians by themselves. In the 
course of this struggle the Mamesh tribe with the support of the Iranian government 
would be able to push the Bilbas tribe through the Kandil Mountain. Having lost their 
summer pasture to Iran, they had financial difficulties and now 700 households of the 
tribe became Iranian citizens. According to Abdullah Pasha, commander of 4th army, if 
the remaining 200 households of the Bilbas tribe could not be able to find a summer 
pasture for their flocks, which were their means of existence, they would prefer to 
become Iranian citizens.193 
The Zodis, one of the sub-groups of the Mengur, was very impressed by the 
Iranians treatment to the Mamesh tribe. Due to that reason after capturing the Peshder 
district of Lahican they gained the possession of the land and then they became citizens 
of Iran. According to Abdullah Pasha, in contrast to Irans’ polite policy against these 
tribal peoples the Ottoman officials regarded them as if they were not human. Because 
of this clear stance, half of both the population and land of Lahican had fallen into the 
hands of the Iranian government. 194 This stance was not peculiar only to these tribes. 
Throughout the end of the 19th century like other modern imperial powers the Ottomans 
represented the subjugation of the tribal peoples as a mission of civilization. For most of 
the 19th century Ottoman officials the terms both “nomad” and “nomadism” had a 
pejorative meaning; they were the synonyms of “savagery”.195 On this frame their main 
object was to “civilize” these peoples: “civilizing the local peoples in this context meant 
turning them loyal Ottoman citizens through the institutions and the homogenizing 
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practices of the modern state”.196 At this point the stance of Abdullah Pasha towards this 
issue was remarkable: According to him if a census was taken among these tribes, it 
would be seen that the Government had lost more people than what it lost in Rumelia. 
197 He insisted on the necessity of census because it could bring meaning and order what 
was an irregular, indistinguishable mass, converting the local population more 
governable and controllable body. On the other hand, census would mean the 
polarization of the population which could serve as a tool for the legitimization of the 
Ottoman claims over territory.198If this census were taken successfully among the tribes 
then it would be easier to tame and civilize them. Otherwise their ignorance and 
nomadic way of life would render them open targets of foreign states, and the Ottoman 
government could not claim any sovereignty over them.199 
 
4.2. Struggle for Sovereignty over the Disputed Lands: The Ben-i Lam Case 
The Ben-i Lam tribe was one of the nomadic tribes of the Empire, which lived in 
the Kutt al Ammara district of Baghdad Province. Their regular residence was in the 
Pusht-i Kuh skirts of the Kebir Kuh mountain chain and around its offshoots.200Being 
composed of a series of sub-groups, some parts of this tribe had migrated to Iran while 
others mostly stayed in the Ottoman Empire. From 1789 to 1849 seven sub-groups of 
the Ben-i Lam tribe fled gradually to Iran for several reasons: over-exploitation by the 
local shaikhs due to tax burden, famine and the willingness of Iran to settle these 
groups.201 
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The Kebir Kuh mountain chain was regarded for centuries as a natural boundary 
between the two states from the very early times. But on the other hand, with the Zohab 
Treaty of 1639 there arose a need to at least an approximate demarcation of the 
borderline. That was because this chain contained important gullets that connected the 
two states to each other and by this means constant trespassing became easier. With the 
Zohab Treaty, the chain was again acknowledged as the boundary but at this time Pish-i 
Kuh, lands before the chain, was given to Iran and Pusht-i Kuh, lands beyond the chain, 
was given to the Ottoman Empire. Although the border was designated in this way, the 
disputes over these lands continued. In the Treaty of Erzurum of 1823 both sides agreed 
on abiding by the terms of the Treaty of 1639, while an article was added: according to 
the first article of the Treaty of Erzurum, Iran would not interfere or intermeddle in 
Baghdad and Kurdistan within the boundaries of Ottoman side and would not let any act 
of molestation, or claim any authority over the present or former possessors of those 
countries.202 In addition to this statement, it was agreed that “on that frontier, should the 
tribes of either side pass the boundaries for a summer or winter residence, the Agents of 
His Royal Highness the Heir Apparent, with the Pasha of Baghdad, shall arrange the 
tribute customary to be paid, the rent of the pastures lands, and other claims, in order 
that they may not cause any misunderstanding between the two governments”. 203 
Although they were divided into two possessions, both Pish-i Kuh and Pusth-i 
Kuh were actually two sub-districts of the Lur-i Kuchik district of the Luristan province 
of Iran. 204 However, Luristan was ruled by a semi-autonomous governor of Iran, 
Huseyin Quli Khan, who had put claims on Pusht-i Kuh. Luristan comprised an entire 
belt of mountainous area, stretching from the plains of the Tigris and the frontier 
mountains on the west towards the borders of Isfahan and Fars on the east, and from the 
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districts of Kermanshah and Hamadan in the north to the plains of Arabia in the 
south.205 
Husein Quli Khan, according to Curzon, with his status seemed to be more 
independent than any other subject of the Shah. His summer pasture was at Dehbala, an 
isolated valley, very difficult to access, and easily defensible by a small amount of men, 
at the foot of a mountain, named Manisht Kuh. He had 2.500 servants who were 
camped around his tent and had 2.700 armed forces, 700 of them being horsemen, well 
mounted and armed, and of 200 were infantry. These armed forces were equipped by 
Martiny rifles which were pillaged from across the Ottoman borderline. Although the 
governor was subjected to Iran, their direction during their seasonal migration never 
turned towards Iran. He and his people mostly preferred to move through Ottoman lands 
to relocate their tents. Their winter pasture was Huseinieh, at the foot of the Pusht-i 
Kuh, just within the Ottoman border. The Vali was trading with Baghdad via Kut al-
Ammarah, on the Tigris. His raids mainly concentrated on upon Ottoman lands, and 
there were constant disputes occurring about the occupation of Seyyid Hasan and its 
neighborhoods. His old and long standing rivals were Ben-i Lam peoples, who were 
citizens of the Ottoman Empire.206 
Seyyid Hasan territory, although it was within the boundaries of Baghdad 
Province and under the possession of Ben-i Lam tribe for a long time, became an area of 
dispute, disorder and molestation. In accordance with the title deed that was given by 
the state to Seyyid Hasan territory, in 1870, it belonged to Sheikh Muslim and from five 
generations onwards this territory was rented by auction by different sub-groups of Ben-
i Lam tribe. By the virtue of their possession of this land the Ottomans claimed 
sovereignty because the Ben-i Lam people were their subjects. 207 From especially the 
second part of the 19th century, the Ottoman state used tax-farming system to expand 
authority over its provinces. While the tribal sheiks were appointed as tax-farmers, the 
government could collect taxes from the tribesman. By means of auction there arose 
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many tribal sheiks who gained control of agricultural estates (muqataa).208 Due to the 
convenience provided by the state on tax-farming system the Ben-i Lam tribe gradually 
became settled in the Baghdad province. In 1885 the usufructary rights of Garibe, a sub-
district of Kutt al Ammara, was given to Ali al Mehmed by auction, and its  fixed 
annual sum was 80.000 liter wheat and 9.600 liter barley.209Although tax-farmers once 
had been appointed by the center, in later times the office was sold by the state. For the 
land under their responsibility, they paid a fixed annual sum to the state as the revenue 
and their salary consisted of whatever they could exploit from the peasants.210 
Although these lands were in the jurisdiction of the Ottoman state through tax-
farming system, they became an open target of Huseyin Quli Khan. From 1886 onwards 
he ventured to attack and plunder the peoples who were wandering around these 
territories; because of constant movements of these peoples, the land had remained 
uncultivated. However, a few of sub-groups of the Ben-i Lam that lived in Iran came to 
Seyyid Hasan to work as fellahs in the field in the summers. But these temporal 
movements did not change the reality of the Ottomans’ possession over the land. 
Furthermore, some Iranian tribes had used Seyyid Hasan as winter pasture and grazed 
their flocks, consisting of 650.000 cattle, without paying any taxes. 211 
 In 1889 Huseyin Quli Khan came up with a request of shifting his allegiance to 
the Ottoman Empire because of the internal turmoil in Iran. According to the report sent 
by the governor of Baghdad; during his meeting with him, the son of the Khan said that 
his father wanted to buy a land within Baghdad province whether his demand was 
accepted or not. Although at the first glance the Khan was seemed as a traitor and an 
unreliable character, Iran had almost lost its control over Luristan and the land and its 
border had become open targets of Kurdish tribes’ incursions. Thus, if the demand of 
the Khan would be accepted there would be an opportunity to create a buffer zone 
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against the Kurdish tribes. 212 His request was discussed at the The Council of Ministers 
and the following decision was taken; His demand would be accepted if the Khan 
consented to be settled anywhere along the Euphrates River, except for Baghdad. 
213However, it seems to be that nothing came out of this proposal. 
From a broader perspective, the proposal of the governor of Baghdad was in many 
aspects right; because after 1889 the power struggles between the Kurdish tribes and 
notables had accelerated. By the creation of Hamidieh regiments in 1891, the Kurdish 
tribes had the impression that their ordinary neglect for authority was now legally 
confirmed and that paved the way of violent acts. Since a tribe accepted Hamidieh 
status it would then not be in the jurisdiction of the local governments. The violent 
events between 1893 and 1894 were generally an inter-tribal nature. The organization of 
the Hamidieh regiments had caused jealousies and changed old balances of power, all of 
which could be worked out in the traditional way.214 For that reason by actualizing the 
proposal of the governor the Ottomans could be able to ensure security of the border to 
some extent.  
In 1891 Mohammed Ali Khan, one of the tax-farmers of Seyyid Hasan, fled to 
Huseyin Quli Khan by leaving the cultivated harvest on the land. There were several 
reasons for leaving the land uncultivated and vacant, such as high expenses of tax, high 
irrigation costs and the extinction of ownership in default of inheritance. All these 
reasons gave the opportunity of capturing and plundering the area to Huseyin Quli 
Khan. In order to claim sovereignty he also forced the indigenous people to accept 
Iranian citizenship.215 
In 1893, Huseyin Quli Khan started to settle the Iranian Sekevend tribe, a sub-
group of the Fili tribe, down in Seyyid Hasan. His aim was to gain territory by settling 
Iranians down. The Sekevend was not a small tribe, consisting of 300 households that 
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scattered around eighty different parts of Seyyid Hasan and started to get involved in 
agriculture. 216  In order to prevent their ever growing expansion throughout the 
territory, the 6th Army was ordered to send one of its military units against the Khan. 
The Ottomans worried that if the Sekevend tribe settled down completely then they 
would possibly claim sovereignty over the land. 217 
Meanwhile, the Ambassador of Ottoman Empire at Tehran was in negotiation 
with the Ambassador of Iran at Istanbul about the Huseyin Quli Khan issue. Iran had 
already declared him as brigand and refused to take any responsibility pertaining to his 
acts. However, she would recognize any armed attacks that were launched by the 
Ottoman troops against the Khan.218 Furthermore for the Ottoman Foreign Minister, 
Said Mehmet Pasha, believed that  Huseyin Quli Khan was supported by a foreign state; 
otherwise he could not be able to undertake this kind of a comprehensive and planned 
act.219  
On April 11th, 1893 the commander of 6th Army, Nusret Pasha sent a report to the 
center about the present situation of Iraq. According to his report, things were 
worsening in the region. Although it was known that there was an internal turmoil in 
Iran, the Iranians exploited these developments in order to compensate their situation in 
the region by using the invasions of Huseyin Quli Khan of Mendeli and Kutt al Amara. 
The news was received that the governor of Baghad had moved to Najaf, although he 
was informed and ordered for an armed struggle against Iran. Under these 
circumstances, commander Mehmed Pasha of Daghıstan was able to reach Zorbatya by 
only taking two cannonballs and 400 men with him. However, although Huseyin Quli 
Khan retreated, he was still present in Seyyid Hasan. Meanwhike in the Vezne sub-
district of Suleimania district the Iranians intensified their incursions. The Mosul 
province was also in turmoil. In the Baghdad province there were inter-tribal struggles 
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among the Kurds whereby they plundered each other. Finally in the Basra province the 
molestations of the Müntefiq tribe were continuing. .220 
The Ottomans were determined to terminate the presence of Huseyin Quli Khan in 
Seyyid Hasan and its neighborhoods. At the same time, it became clear that for a few 
years several sheikhs and tribes had been migrating from Ammara to Iran. The 
underlying reason of that was the maladministration of the local governors and their 
reluctance of dealing with the people who wanted to come back to the Ottoman Empire. 
In order to obviate this demographical loss an Imperial decree was issued whereby the 
status of Seyyid Hasan and its neighborhoods would be elevated to sub-district and the 
people who lived there would be taken under the control of governmental apparatus and 
additionally a fair amount of troops would be resided there.221 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis discusses three interrelated issues which determined Ottoman-Iranian 
relationship in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. First, foundation of a modern 
state apparatus with its control mechanisms to establish full supervision over its 
subjects; second,  confessional disagreement between the Ottoman Empire and Iran in 
terms of Sunni Islam versus Twelver Shia; and finally, the issue of borderlands with its 
freely migrating tribal and nomadic populations.    
One conclusion, reached at this study concerns the lack of consistency in the 
application of citizenship policies in the Ottoman Empire. Whereas the citizenship 
ideals of the Tanzimat-era underlined the principle of equality in the application of 
citizenship laws irrespective of religion or race, Ottoman subjects of non-Sunni origin 
were not treated as full citizens in marriage issues. The same was true for Iranian males 
who married Ottoman women. Their marriages were considered to be illegitimate, and 
an actual law was promulgated in 1874 to prohibit marriages of Ottoman female citizens 
with Iranian males. However, as this thesis also shows, such prohibitions lacked actual 
efficiency. Several documentary examples prove us that in the real life this ban was 
often violated by Ottomans and Iranians. 
The apparent inconsistency of the Sublime Porte policies in terms of equal 
citizenship leads us to think about the policy of Ottomanism itself, which was officially 
declared with the Reform Edict of 1856. It takes the main non-Muslim communities as 
well as the Muslims into consideration. However, the fact that the edict uses the term 
“Muslims” in a general sense without making any distinction between Sunnis and 
various non-Sunni populations actually indicates the continuation of the centuries-long 
policy of ignoring the existence of communities such as the Twelver Shiites within the 
Ottoman realm. Therefore it could be claimed that despite the seemingly secular and 
liberal approach of Ottomanist policies, the actual Sunni character of the Ottoman State 
remained deep-rooted, which in turn displays the limits of Ottomanism. 
This segregative attitude of the Sublime Porte towards the Twelver Shiites 
should also be understood in the background of the rather hostile Ottoman-Iranian 
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relations. As seen in Chapters II and IV, the borderlands of Kurdistan and southern Iraq 
continued to remain contested terrains from the sixteenth until the late nineteenth 
centuries. Here we understand the importance of the local tribes for the Ottoman-Iranian 
relationship; the Ottoman State, Iran and the Kurdish tribes (such as the Beni Lam case) 
constituded three political factors which used each other for their own respective 
political gains. The fact that Iranians used Shiism as a means of gaining political 
influence in the borderlands as well as in Iraq strengthened Ottoman enmity towards the 
Shiites, which reflected itself in policies of citizenship and marriage. 
Another issue which was a source of tension between the Ottoman Empire and 
Iran was the conscription of Iranian subjects by the Ottoman army. The Conscription 
Law of 1886 specified that while citizens of foreign states would be exempted from 
conscription, residents with Iranian nationality were to perform military service. This 
law in fact was in harmony with the Prohibition Law of 1874 where it was stipulated 
that children born from the marriages of an Iranian man and an Ottoman woman would 
be considered to be Ottoman citizens. Such legal measures were in harmony with the 
long-standing Sunni Ottoman hostility vis-à-vis the Twelver Shia. However, an 
additional factor promoting these policies even further was also related to the expansion 
of Twelver Shiite belief among the tribes of Irak and increasing mixed marriages along 
the border regions. These developments created security concerns among the Ottoman 
governing circles; it was feared that the Sunni population was decreasing and the 
demographic basis eligible for military conscription was shrinking in regions such as 
Iraq.   
An additional source of Ottoman administrative weakness in the borderlands 
adjacent to Iran was related to Ottoman misgovernment; the case of the Bilbas tribe 
shows us how a population group, despite its Sunni Islamic belief and traditional loyalty 
to the Ottoman State, was eventually forced in the 1820s to seek for the protection of 
Iran due to the arbitrary administration of the Ottoman governor of Baghdad. However, 
the increasing pressure from the Iranian side in the 1880s led the same tribe again to 
take side with the Ottomans. These shifts in political allegiance in turn were closely 
related to the Ottoman and Iranian struggles to gain control over border territories which 
were still undefined in terms of border delineation.  
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Another aspect of Ottoman misgovernment was related to the Orientalist attitude 
of the administrators vis-à-vis local populations of the borderlands. The condescending 
approach towards the nomadic lifestyle and the policy of subjugation with the aim of 
civilizing the tribal populations led local tribes to move towards Iran. Certain Ottoman 
administrators believed that measures such as population census would be sufficient for 
gaining control over such population groups. 
To conclude, factors such as the foundation of a modern state apparatus with its 
control mechanisms, the confessional disagreement between the Ottoman Empire and 
Iran in terms of Sunni Islam versus Twelver Shia, and finally the issue of borderlands 
with its freely migrating tribal and nomadic populations created local conflicts and 
tensions which could not be completely solved even until the present time. 
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